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INTRODUCTION
Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972 prohibits gender
discrimination. Although pregnancy has been described as the "quintes-
sential sex difference,"' Title IX's prohibition of gender discrimination
in the context of parenting and pregnant students has often been left out
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1.Deborah L. Brake, The Invisible Pregnant Athlete and the Promise of Title JX, 31
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of the discussion , and therefore the understanding,' of the implementa-
tion of Title IX Regulations. The scholarship discussing the topic shows
general agreement that the language and spirit of Title IX has not been
given effect thus far by our schools or by some Courts.'
This Article begins by looking to the Title IX regulations them-
selves and then to the research indicating that this aspect of Title IX has
yet to be fulfilled. With that understanding, it turns to the litigation
landscape to identify trends in the case law, including strengths, weak-
nesses, and gaps.' Next, this Article looks to societal impacts, specifically
lack of awareness, discourses and legal mobilization, in order to garner
an understanding of why the Title IX Regulations for pregnant and par-
enting teens have not been more strongly implemented in schools or
litigated in courts.
A. Title lX and HEW Regulations
In 2006, the National Campaign to Prevent Teenage Pregnancy re-
ported that approximately 850,000 teenage girls become pregnant and
that these pregnancies result in over 500,000 births each year.6 Other
studies have shown that becoming a mother during secondary school
increases the chances of dropping out!
2. Katherine Hanson et a]., MOPEt THAN TITLE IX : HOW EQUITY IN EDUCATION HAS
SHAPED THE NATION 161 (Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 2009) ("For many
people, Title IX signifies sports, not education. Although this nondiscrimination law
covers all aspects of education, it was its impact on athletics and sports that caused the
most ferocious reactions to it."). See also, e.g., Editorial, Title D, Back on Track, N.Y.
TIMES, Apr. 20, 2010, http://www.nyfimes.com/201 0/04/21/lopinion/21lwed3.html;
Katie Thomas, Rule Change Takes Aim at Loophole in Title IX, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 19, 2010,
http://www.nyimes.com2010/04/20/sports/20tid~eix.htm.
3. See infra Part 11. A, Lack of Knowledge, for discussion of unawareness by students
and school personnel.
4. See, e.g., Catherine Marshall & Gary L. Anderson, Rethinking the public and private
spheres: feminist and cultural studies perspectives on the politics of education, POLITICS OF
EDUCATION ASSOCIATION YEARBIOOK 176 (1994) ("[Wlith little effort at monitoring,
training, or enforcement, and with ample attention to protecting dominant interests
from any ill effects of sex equity, gender equity is still problematic after 20 years of
policy nonimplementation.").
5. Not since 1994 has any of the literature provided such an overview of the litigation,
and the cases have more than tripled since Deborah Brake's Clearinghouse Review at-
ticle. See infra note 1s4 and accompanying text.
6. Brittany Ducker, Chalk Talk: Overcoming the Hurdles: Title DC and Equal Educational
Attainment for Pregnant and Parenti ng Students, 36 J.L. & EDUC. 445, 445 (2007).
7. See Ducker, supra note 6; Madeline E. McNeeley, Title IX and Equal Educational
Access for Pregnant and Parenting Girls, 22 Wis. WOMEN'S L.J. 267, 268 (2007); see
also National Women's Law Center ("NWLC"), When Girls Don't Graduate, We all
[Vol. 17:211212
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Research indicates that teen pregnancy is the number one reason
that girls drop out of high school.' Indeed, the pamphlet created and
distributed by the Office for Civil Rights in 1991 for school administra-
tors, teachers, and staff, as well as students and parents, discussing U.S.
Department of Education regulation of the requirements under Title IX
states that " [p] regnancy is the leading reason for females to drop out of
high school.. .. The problem is not limited to racial or ethnic minori-
ties; in fact, 58% of pregnant teens are white."9
At the same time, research done by Wanda S. Pillow, Professor of
Education Policy at University of Illinois-Urbana Champagne, shows
another relationship between teen pregnancy and high school reentry.
Her work demonstrates that many teen mothers who dropped out be-
fore being pregnant returned to school after being pregnant: "[Ulp to
25% of female dropouts return to school when they are pregnant."'0 Re-
search by Amber Hausenfluck reinforced this point, describing a mother
who reported returning to school after having dropped out in order to
gain an education that would enable her to provide for her daughter."'
In addition, research indicates that pregnancy disproportionately
impacts female students' educational experience as compared to male
students who father children."2 For example, research by the Gates
Foundation shows that 33% of female students, but only 19% of male
Fail (2007), available at http://www. nwlc.org/resource/when-girls-dont-graduate-we-
alI-fail-calI-improve-high-school-graduation-rates-girs ("When asked, one-quarter to
one-third of female dropouts say that pregnancy or becoming a patent played a role
in their decision to drop our. According to a recent survey sponsored by the Gates
Foundation, 33% of female dropouts reported that becoming a parent played a major
role in their decision to leave school. In another survey, close to 27% of tenth to
twelfth grade female dropouts said that pregnancy was one of their reason for leaving,
making it the third most cited behind nor liking school and failing in school . . .. A
national study also found that approximately 30% of teens dropped out following
pregnancy") (internal citations omitted); NWLC, NrWLC Supports Bill to Improve
Outcomes for Pregnant and Parenting Students: Teen Pregnancy Rates and Dropout Rates
Go Hand-in-Hand (2010), available at http://www.nwc.org/press-release/nwlc-
supports-bill-improve-outcomes-pregnant-and-parenting-students ("Only 51 percent
of women who have children as teenagers get a high school diploma by age 22 com-
pared to 89 percent of teens who do not give birth").
8. McNeeley, supra note 7, at 268.
9. U.S. DEP'T OF EDUC., OFFICE FOR CtWIL RIGHTS, TEENAGE PREGNANCY AND
PARENTHOOD ISSUES UNDER TITLE IX OF THE EDUCATION AMENDMENTS OF 1972 2,
30(991).
10. WANDA S. PILLOW, UNFIT SUBJECTS: EDUCATIONAL POLICY AND THE TEEN MOTHER
117(2004).
11. Amber Hausenfluck, Comment, A Pregnant Teenagers Right to Education in Texas, 9
SCHOLAR 151 (2006).
12. Pillow, supra note 10, at 68-69; NWLC, supra note 7, at 12.
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students, listed pregnancy as a reason for their decision to drop out."
Such statistics illustrate how school-aged pregnancy and parenting con-
tinue to raise gender equity issues.'"
Accordingly, the implementation of the Title IX Regulations related
to pregnant and parenting students is important because it addresses a
significant population of students and presents high-stakes challenges
for school organizations."1
In 1972, President Nixon signed Title IX of the Educational
Amendments. In 1974, the cabinet-level Department of Health, Educa-
tion, and Welfare ("HEW"' 6' enacted Regulations ("Regulations") to
effectuate Title LX, 1 7 which specifically address gender equity concerns in
the context of pregnancy.'" The Regulations provide that
(1)[A] recipient [of federal funding] shall not discriminate
against any student, or exclude any student from its education
program or activity, including any class or extracurricular ac-
tivity, on the basis of such student's pregnancy, childbirth, false
pregnancy, termination of pregnancy or recovery therefrom,
unless the student requests voluntarily to participate in a sepa-
rate portion of the program.
13. NWLC, supra note 7, at 12.
14. For thorough discussions of the history of treatment of pregnant and parenting teens
see Deborah Brake, Legal Challenges to the Educational Barriers Facing Pregnant and
Parenting Adolescents, 28 CLEARINGHOUSE REv. 141 (1994); Kendra Fershee, Hollow
Promises for Pregnant Students: How the Regulations Governing Title IX Fail to Prevent
Pregnancy Discrimination in School, 43 IND. L. Ray. 79 (2009); WENDY LUrr7RELL,
PREGNANT BODiEs, FERTILE MINDS (2003); Pillow, supra note 10.
15. McNeeley, supra note 7, at 269 (describing that 7-8% of teenage girls become preg-
nateach year and that nearly one-third of teenage girls will become pregnant by the
age of 20).
16. The Department was created under President Eisenhower in 1953. In 1979, a sepa-
rate Education Department was created and HEW became the Department of
Health and Human Services in 1980. See U.S. Dept. of Health & Human Serv.,
About Us Historical Highlights, http://www.hhs.govlabout/hhshist.htm.
17. 34 C.F.R. § 106.1 ("The purpose of this part is to effectuate Title IX of the FEduca-
tion Amendments of 1972, as amended by Pub. L. 93-568, 88 Stat. 1855 (except
sections 904 and 906 of those Amendments) which is designed to eliminate (with
certain exceptions) discrimination on the basis of sex in any education program or ac-
tivity receiving Federal financial assistance, whether or not such program or activity is
offered or sponsored by an educational institution as defined in this part. This part is
also intended to effectuate section 844 of the Education Amendments of 1974, Pub.
L. 93-380, 88 Stat. 484. The effective date of this part shall be July 21, 1975.").
18. Fershee, supra note 14, at 79; see also Pillow, supra note 10, at 56.
214
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(3) A recipient which operates a portion of its education pro-
gram or activity separately for pregnant students, admittance
to which is completely voluntary on the part of the student as
provided in paragraph (b)(1) of this section shall ensure that
the instructional program in the separate program is compara-
ble to that offered to non-pregnant students.
(4) A recipient shall treat pregnancy, childbirth, false pregnan-
cy, termination of pregnancy and recovery therefrom in the
same manner and under the same policies as any other tempo-
rary disability with respect to any medical . .. policy which
such recipient administers, operates, offers, or participates in
with respect to students admitted to the recipient's educational
program or activity."
Title IX and the Regulations became effective in 1975, thirty-five years
20
ago.
.Under the Title IX Regulations, public schools and private schools
that receive federal funds must both accommodate pregnant and parent-
ing students and also provide these students equal treatmen t. In a 2008
article, law professor Deborah Brake describes these potentially conflict-
ing demands:
By including both accommodation rights, independent of how
other students are treated, and comparative rights, treating
pregnant students as well as other temporarily disabled stu-
dents, Title IX straddles the equal treatment/special treatment
divide that has characterized so much of the discourse surround-
ing discrimination law's treatment. Feminists have often
struggled with whether to analyze pregnancy under a special
treatment model, requiring extra accommodation of pregnancy,
19. 34 C.F.R. 106.40(b).
20. 34 C. F. R. §106. 1.
21. See 34 C.F.R. § 106.2(h)(3) for inclusion of private schools that receive federal mon-
ies. But see 34 C.F.R § 106.12 ("This part does not apply to an educational
institution which is controlled by a religious organization to the extent application of
this part would not he consistent with the religious tenets of such organization."). See
also infra notes 222-225 and accompanying text for discussion of how students with
pregnancy- related disability may be able to use Section 504 to assert rights against
private schools.
22. Brake, supra note 1, at 344-47.
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or an equal treatment model, requiring pregnancy to be treat-
ed as well (or as badly) as some comparable condition .
Brake explains that Title IX's straddling of the two is beneficial because
each has flaws and thus Title IX "mitigates the downsides of both."
24
In contrast, Kendra Fershee and Madeline McNeeley suggest that
coupling equal treatment requirements with accommodation has pre-
sented schools with unclear and challenging legal requirements.
However, as will be discussed in Part 111, many schools are unfamiliar
with the requirements at all, which suggests that failures to implement
the regulations are less an issue of vagueness and/or complexities in the
requirements and more an issue of lack of awareness.
B. Enactment Alone Does Not Accomplish Social Reform
In addition to the above issues arising from the inclusion of both
equal treatment and accommodation requirements," Title IX's imple-
mentation has been far from clear. The literature discussing pregnant
and parenting students covers an array of areas, including athletics, in-
struction, single-sex schools, and extracurricular activities. It also calls
for additional regulations from the federal government and discussions
of social discursive forces at play in the failures in implementation. Yet
while the topics covered in the literature vary, the scholarship shows
general agreement that Title IX has not been given its full range by
schools and some courts. As will be discussed, research shows that
23. Id. at 344.
24. Id. at 346-47 (" [The comparative model artificially reduces pregnancy to a narrow
physical dimension so that it can be analogized to a temporary disability. This poses
the risk that the nonphysical dimension of pregnancy will be ignored. ... [Tihe spe-
cial treatmenr model invires grearer attention to the ways in which pregnancy is
unlike temporary disabilities.... Pregnancy implicates women's identities, life cours-
es, and relationships to others in ways that knee injuries and ankle sprains do not,
and there is value in having an approach to equality that recognizes the uniqueness to
pregnancy.").
25. McNeeley, supra note 7, at 268; see Fershee, supra note 14, at 1 10.
26. See McNeeley, supra note 7, at 268 ("Federal regulations set forth seemingly bright-
line rules extending this protection.... Nevertheless, pregnant and parenting teens
are frequently denied educational rights because some of the legal requirements are
unclear and schools are often unwilling or unable to accommodate the girls."); Brake,
supra note 1, at 337 ("Like other major federal antidiscrimination statutes, the key
language simply bans discrimination on the basis of sex, leaving to interpretation im-
portant questions about the meaning of discrimination and the scope of the protected
class characteristic.").
27. See, e.g., Brake, supra note 1; Pillow, supra note 10.
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schools continue to practice informal push-out policies, operate less-
than-comparable alternative schools, treat pregnant and parenting stu-
dents with hostility, fail to accommodate pregnant and parenting
students' health and emotional issues, prohibit or discourage pregnsant
and parenting students from participating in certain classes, and in gen-
eral, continue to treat pregnant and parenting students differently than
students with other health challenges and conditions.
This Article argues that there are three central reasons for the fail-
ures in implementation: 1) the perception of little or no case law; 2) lack
of knowledge of "front-line service providers to pregnant and mothering
teens" 29 and of students themselves; 0 and 3) the social and legal margin-
alizarion of the affected students . 3'1 Further, this Article emphasizes that
the litigation landscape shows pregnant and parenting students often
assert other rights. In some cases, litigants have asserted other legal
claims alongside Title IX claims; in other cases litigants have asserted
other legal protections exclusively-sometimes to their detriment. This
review of the case law ultimately indicates that while Title IX is central
in the litigation, other constitutional protections, particularly privacy,
are often implicated.
This Article proposes three means for improving the fulfillment of
the Title IX law: first, increase awareness of the existing case law and
effective use of litigation as a strategy for improving enforcement; se-
cond, impose law and education requirements for teachers and
administrators; and third, increase regulation by the Office for Civil
28. See Brake, supra note 14; Deborah L. Brake, When Equality Leaves Everyone Worse
Off The Prohlemt of Leveling Down in Equality Law, 46 Wm. & MARY L. REsV. 513
(2004); Tamara S. Ling, Lifting Voices: Towards Equal Education for Pregnant and
Parenting Students in New York City, 29 FoRDn-~w IJRB. L.J. 2387, 2389 (2002);
McNeeley, supra note 7; MARGARET A. NASH & MARGARET DUNKLE, THE NEED FOR
A WARMING TREND: A SURVEY OF THE SCHOOL CLIMATE FOR PREGNANT AND PAR-
ENTING TEENS (1989); see also Part I. B.
29. See Wanda S. Pillow, Teen Pregnancy and Education: Politics of Knowledge, Research,
and Practice, 20 EDUC. POL'Y 59, 60 (2006) for term. For discussion of lack of
knowledge by teachers and administrators, see infra Part III.
30. MARGARLET A. NASH & MARGARET DUNKLE, THE NEED FOR A WARMING TREND: A
SURVEY OF THE SCHOOL CLIMATE FOR PREGNANT AND PARENTING TEENS 5-11
(Equality Ctr. 1989),; NWLC, supra note 7 ("According to the Gates Foundation re-
port ... those who left [were).. . most likely to say that they would have worked
harder if their schools would have demanded more of them and provided the neces-
sary support ... many pregnant students dropped out because they 'unable to juggle'
the demands of school and parenthood and seemed unaware of any assistance at their
schools that might have helped them ease their burden."); Pillow, supra note 10.
31. See infra notes 295-302 and accompanying text.
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Rights .3  The article argues that increased regulation alongside increased
awareness combined with, or as part of, such law and education
requirements for educators will combat the marginalization of the stu-
dents most impacted by developing their perception as "rights-bearing"
individuals. This change in perception will begin to chip away at the
rights-derogating discourses that have shaped the discussion of the edu-
cation of pregnant and parenting students."3
1. LACK OF CASE L~w?
The United States Supreme Court upheld Title IX as a private right
of action in Jackson v. Birmingham Board of Eaucation.4 Yet, the number
of Title IX cases addressing the rights of pregnant and parenting stu-
dents is disproportionately small to the number of students that research
indicates are having their rights violated in schools. Indeed, the bulk of
literature discussing Title IX Regulations and school-aged expectant and
current mothers describes a lack of case law on point. In her 1994 article
Brake said, "Because very little case law exists interpreting the rights of
pregnant students under Title IX, courts evaluating these claims should
be guided primarily by the language of the Title LX regulation."" Ten
years later, Pillow says that " []here has been no case law under Title IX
to determine what educational opportunities for school-age mothers
looks like and why schools continue to be ambivalent."316 McNeeley's
2007 law review article states, "[T~here is an almost total absence of liti-
gation in this area, except for several cases in which students have been
excluded or dismissed from the National Honor Sociey. ,17 The National
Honor Society ("NHS") cases are discussed in detail in Part 11(A), but
32. Kendra Fershee makes the argument for increased regulations by the OCR in Hollow
Promises for Pregnant Students: How the Regulations Governing Title IX Fail to Prevent
Pregnancy Discrimination in School, supra note 14.
33. NANCY LESKO, ACT YOUR AGE! A CULTURAL CONSTRUCTION OF ADOLESCENCE 144
(2001) (arguing that "reproductive rights must include health care, sex education,
AIDS prevention, and so on (sic) will shift the present immoral status of teenage
mothers.").
34. Jackson v. Birmingham Bd. of Educ., 544 U.S. 167 (2005). For discussion of private
actions under Title IX of the Education Amendments in comparison to Title VI of
the Civil Rights Act, see R. Shep Melnick, Taking Remedies Seriously: Can Courts Con-
trol Public Schools?, in FROM SCHOOLHOUSE TO COURTHOUSE: THE JUDICIARY'S ROLE
IN AMERICAN EDUCATION 17-39 (Joshua M. Dunn & Martin R. West eds., Brook-
ings Inst. Press 2009).
35. Brake, supra note 14, at 144.
36. Pillow, supra note 10, at 13.
37. McNeeley, supra note 7.
Vol. 17:211218
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for now it is sufficient to note that the four NHS cases represent less
than a fourth of the cases addressing the rights of pregnant and parent-
ing teens in school. McNeeley's description illustrates how the
perception of a lack of case law persists despite the existence and growth
of a body of cases, more than half of which were resolved in favor of the
students. Numerous other law reviews and articles continue to describe
and reinforce the perceived lack of case law addressing school-aged cur-
rent and expectant mothers, either generally or under specific topics."'
Not since Brake's 1994 article has any of the literature provided a
thorough, updated review of the case law on point. Such an updated
review is called for, given that when Brake wrote Legal Challenges to the
Educational Barriers Facing Pregnant and Parenting Adolescents in 1994,
there were only six cases on point, five of which were addressed by
Brake. There are now eighteen cases; the number has more than tripled.
While the 2009 law review article by Fershee 9 provides an excellent dis-
cussion of cases decided prior to the enactment of Title IX, the case law
discussion is limited to pre-Title IX decisions.' Further, while the pur-
pose of Fershee's article is not to provide a review, the article, along with
those discussed above, references the lack of case law,"' thus reinforcing
the notion that little or no helpful precedent exists.
The significance of case law is highlighted by Katherine Hanson et
al. in More than Title IX~ How Equity in Education has Shaped the Na-
tion. Ray Rose, former teacher and former staff member of
Massachusetts Department of Education's Bureau of Equal Educational
Opportunity, is quoted as aptly stating, "Legislation was important to
help get people to change their behaviors, policies, and classroom con-
tent. We were able to use the laws to change the code. Without the
national cases and the defining legal judgments, a lot of this wouldn't
have happened. We need cases to get things moving." Rose's comment
illustrates the importance of case law, explains why the myth of there
38. Ling, supra note 28, at 2400 ("Unfortunately, the regulations do not explicitly set
forth criteria for determining comparability and there has been no case law directly
on point."); Hausenfluck, supra note 11, at 173 C" [t]here is no case law defining what
constitutes "voluntary" under Tide IX. .. ); id. at 176 ("It is difficult to compare
the quality of alternative education programs to that of home campuses. .. and 3)
there has yet to be case law on point.").
39. Fershee, supra note 14, at 82, 88.
40. Id; see also Pillow, supra note 10 (describing very few post-Title IX cases).
41. Fershee, supra note 14, at I111 ("To date, there are no federal cases regarding the poor
quality of education available to pregnant students. This dearth of cases certainly does
not imply that no problem exists. ... Because the regulations are silent as to what
"1comparable" means, schools can operate academically inferior schools without fear
of reprisal.").
42. Hanson et al., supra note 2, at 28 (emphasis added).
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being no case law addressing pregnant and parenting students is prob-
lematic, and, as will be discussed in Part 113, emphasizes the importance
of highlighting the case law that we do have. This Article now turns to
examine the legal landscape for Title IX pregnant and parenting student
claims.
A. The Cases
As of January 2010, there were a total of eighteen cases related to
Title IX and pregnant and parenting students,4 thirteen of which al-
leged Title IX violations. Three cases present fact patterns that
correspond to existing Title IX precedent and arguably could have but
did nor raise Title IX violations, and one case presented a unique fact
pattern under which the plaintiffs could have alleged Title IX violations
but did not. Keeping in mind the earlier discussion of how Title IX re-
quires both accommodation and equal protection, the cases are
organized under these broad categories in order to provide architecture
to the discussion. Five cases fall under "accommodation"' and thirteen
fall under the category of "equal treatment." Each will be treated dis-
tinctly under its respective category with enough of the fact pattern to
give light to the situations for which claims have arisen and a sufficient
description of the holding to illuminate how courts are and are not en-
forcing Title IX for pregnant and parenting students.
1. Accommodation Cases
There are five cases that address Title IX claims by pregnant and/or
parenting students. These cases represent a disproportionately small
number in comparison to the number of students shown by research to
be affected by the failures in Title IX implementation. They represent,
however, a varied and enlightening array of claims and holdings, includ-
ing: one claim against a college for failure to provide childcare; 44 one
45
claim by a father seeking pregnancy relief under NCAA rules; two
43. Starting in November 2009 and using Westlaw, I gathered 17 cases that specifically
applied to this discussion. I re-ran the search in January 2010 and was able to gather
one additional claim. I have also cross-checked this group of cases through multiple
law reviews and articles on the topic.
44. De La Cruz v. Tormey, 582 F.2d 45 (9th Cir. 1978), cert. denied sub nom. Tormey v.
De La Cruz, 441 U.S. 965 (1979).
45. Butler v. Nat'l Collegiate Athletic Ass'n., No. 06-23 19 KHV, 2006 WL 2398683
(D. Kan. Aug. 15, 2006).
Vol. 17:211220
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claims for accommodations for coursework and/or class structure due to
significant pregnancy complications;"6 and one claim for which few facts
are provided but which alleges discrimination on the basis of pregnancy
and pregnancy-related disabilities."7
a. De La Cruz v. Tormey-The Childcare Case
This 1978 case has not been distinguished or overturned. In fact, it
was cited by a later Ninth Circuit opinion for its remarks on the role of
the judiciary in school policy.4" Brake also references it in her 1994 article's
discussion of disparate impact claims.49 Here, the pla-intiffs alleged that the
community college had denied their equal opportunity to education and
46. Ivan v. Kent State Univ., 863 F. Supp. 581 (N.D. Ohio 1994), affd, Ivan v. Kent
State Univ., 92 F.3d 1185 (6th Cit. 1996); Hogan v. Ogden, No. Cu-06-5078 EFS,
2008 WI. 2954245 (E.D. Wash. July 30, 2008); Darian v. Univ. of Mass. Boston,
980 F. Supp 77 (D. Mass 1997).
47. Garrett v. Chi. Sch. Reform Bd. of Tr., No. 95C7341, 1996 WI. 411319 (N.D. Ill
July 19, 1996).
48. "In doing this our effort joins a growing number of cases in which the federal courts
have been called upon to trace the bounds of equal educational opportunity" as re-
quired by the Constitution or statute. Decisions flowing from such an undertaking
involve, inter alia, The question of "the proper role of the federal judiciary in oversee-
ing the decisions of local administrative bodies in the field of public education." De
La Cruz v. Tormey, 582 F.2d 45, 47 (9th Cir. 1978). "Responding to this question
also involves considering the interests of the children being educated, their parents,
and the local school authorities, the respective roles of the state and federal govern-
ments, the competency of the federal courts to undertake the requested education
oversight, and, at least in this case, the nature of the social compact that binds this
Nation together." Guadalupe Org., Inc. v. Tempe Elem. Sch. Dist. No. 3, 587 F.2d
1022, 1025 (9th Cit. 1978) a'isapproved of on other grounds by Yniguez v. Ariz. for Of-
ficial English, 69 F.3d 920 (9th Cit. 1994) (citing Guadalupe for importance of
common grounds but then stating for contrast, "Equally important, however, is the
American tradition of tolerance, a tradition that recognizes a critical difference be-
tween encouraging the use of English and repressing the use of other languages.
Arizona's rejection of that tradition has severe consequences not only for its public of-
ficials and employees, but for the many thousands of Arizonanis who would be
precluded from receiving essential information from their state and local governments
if the drastic prohibition contained in the provision were to be implemented.").
49. Brake, supra note 14, at 154. Disparate impact claims reference those claims in which
a party claims that individuals sharing a particular characteristic are disproportionate-
ly treated or affected differently through application of a facially neutral policy.
Because disparate impact theory does not consider intention, it is distinct from inten-
tional discrimination. For additional discussion of disparate impact theory, see Brake,
supra note 14; see also Deborah Brake, What Counts as "Discrimination" in Ledbetter
and the Implications for Sex Equality Law, 58 S.C. L. REv. 657 (2008); Julia A. Davis
& Lisa M. Bohon, Re-Imagining Public Enforcement of Title IX, B.Y.U. EDUC. & L.J.
25, 47 (2007).
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violated Title IX by its failure to provide child care."0 The court held that
the plaintiffs' claims should survive summary judgment.
Material facts discussed in the opinion included: plaintiffs' allega-
tions that the college had failed to provide child care despite "an
apparently severe shortage of child care facilities for low-income families
in San Mateo County;"5' a presentation to the Board of Trustees by the
Associated Students of the College of San Mateo (ASCSM) describing
the result of a survey of over 3,500 students that showed a high need for
child care; a report by a hired consultant that described a severe need
and recommended a procedure to address it, including seeking state and
federal grant money; a report by the District Advisory Committee for
Early Childhood Education, composed of faculty and students of the
Early Childhood Education Department and community member and
public services agencies that recommended that a campus child care fa-
cility be developed; and two separate grant opportunities that were
offered, one at the federal level and one at the state level, that required
no financial obligation from the college but required approval, which
the college refused.5"
The federal district court noted that the plaintiffs included mothers
who would attend community college if child care facilities were provid-
ed but were not able to because of the lack of such facilities:
All of the plaintiffs in this case are being denied an opportuni-
ty for education or are threatened with a denial of educational
opportunity solely on account of the lack of child care facili-
ties. ... Since the plaintiffs cannot find employment without
more education, the denial of child care facilities forces the
plaintiffs into low paying jobs or onto welfare ....
There can be little doubt that a discriminatory effect, as that
term is properly understood and has been used by the Su-
preme Court, has been adequately alleged. The concrete
human consequences flowing from the lack of sufficient child
care facilities, very practical impediments to beneficial partic-
ipation in the Districts' educational program, are asserted to
fall overwhelmingly upon women students and would-be
students."
50. De La Cruz v. Tormney, 582 F.2d 45, 47 (9th Cir. 1978).
51. DeLa Cruz, 582 F.2d at 48.
52. De La Cruz, 582 F.2d at 48-49.
53. De La Cruz, 582 F.2d at 53.
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The court was also careful to address the issue of inaction and held that
a school district's failure to establish provisions for child care for its stu-
dents may constitute an act that is subject to challenge for having a
discriminatory impact on women and, therefore, violates Title IX."4
b. Butler v. National Collegiate Athletic Association-
The Father-Athlete case
Toure Butler filed a claim alleging Title IX violation for the inequi-
table treatment of fathers in the National Collegiate Athletic Association
("NCAA") 5 athletic regulation that allowed mothers, but not fathers, to
receive a one-year waiver in athletic eligibility for the reason of pregnan-
cy. 56Butler sought a temporary restraining order against the NCAA
determination that his five-year athletic eligibility had expired. Butler
argued that he lost a year of opportunity to play football because he
changed plans to attend NMSU in order to work to provide and care for
his daughter. The court emphasized that the NCAA provision allowed
the one-year waiver for pregnancy and not motherhood or fatherhood
and denied the injunction .
54. De La Cruz, 582 F.2d at 53-58.
55. In National Collegiate Athletic Association v. R.M. Smith, the United States Supreme
Court overturned the Third Circuit's conclusion that the NCAA is subject to a pri-
vate action under Title IX because it received dues from universities that received
funding from the federal government, but the Court left open the two alternative ar-
guments advanced for application of Title IX to the NCAA for the lower courts to
determine. Nat'l Collegiate Athletic Ass'n v. R.M. Smith, 525 U.S. 459, 469 (1999).
On remand, the Third Circuit held that "Smith presented a viable theory for subject-
ing the NCAA to Title IX's requirements and thus her proposed amendment would
not be futile." Nat'l Collegiate Athletic Ass'n v. R.M. Smith, 266 F.3d 152, 163 (3d
Cit. 2001).
56. Butler v. Nat'l Collegiate Athletic Ass'n., No. 06-23 19 KHV, 2006 WL 2398683 at
*3 (D. Kan. Aug. 15, 2006).
57. Butler, 2006 WL 2398683, at *3. For additional discussion of this case, see Sarah
McCarthy, Comment, The Legal and Social Implication of the NCAA 's "Pregnancy Ex-
ception '-Does the NC'lA Discriminate Against Male Student-Athletes?, 14 VI LL.
SPORTs & ENT. L.J. 327 (2007); Brake supra note 1, at 357 (describing and criticizing
court's decision).
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c. Hogan v. Ogden and Darian v. University of Massachusetts Boston-
The Coursework Accommodation Cases
i. Hogan v. Ogden
In Hogan, the federal district court denied summary judgment to
defendants regarding Hogan's claims of Title IX violations in discrimi-
nating against her based upon her pregnancy."8 Hogan was a student at
Central Washington University and enrolled in a senior-level video pro-
duction course that included lectures, exercises, and projects.
Until the end of October, Hogan had attended every class. On Oc-
tober 27, however, Hogan had contacted her instructor to miss class
because she was eight months pregnant and experiencing complications. 9
Hogan was then placed on bed rest and missed a test given two days later.
Hogan requested to have the test given at her home and explained that
she was prepared but unable to travel to the school. In response, the in-
structor encouraged her to withdraw from the course because she was
causing hardship for her group and was at a risk of failing.' Hogan re-
plied and proposed two means for raking the exam: 1) that a student
proctor give it at her home; or 2) that her mother could drive her to the
school in 8 days.6 She also explained that her group "did not object to her
absence. In fact, without Defendant Ogden's knowledge, her grouip
helped her stay involved despite her absence. One group member took
notes for Hogan during class. At another point, members from Hogan's
group traveled to her home to work on the group project. ,2The in-
structor rejected both of Hogan's proposed means for taking the exam
and again encouraged Hogan to withdraw, noting that she was not go-
ing to be able to pass and that it was in "everyone's best interest.",
6
1
Hogan's group eventually contacted the instructor to get clarification
about Hogan's status and indicated that they wanted her to participate if
she could take and pass the equipment exam. The instructor directed
them to move on without her.6 Hogan ultimately withdrew and filed a
Title IX action for the lack of accommodation.
58. Hogan v. Ogden, No. Cu-06-5078 EFS, 2008 WL 2954245 (E.D. Wash. July 30,
2008).
59. Hogan, 2008 WL 2954245, at *I.
60. Hogan, 2008 WL 2954245, at *2.
61. Hogan. 2008 WL 2954245, at *2.
62. Hogan, 2008 WL 2954245, at *2 (citations omitted).
63. Hogan, 2008 WL 2954245, at *2.
64. Hogan, 2008 'WXL 2954245, at *2.
65. Hogan, 2008 WL 2954245, at *3.
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The court held that Hogan had made a prima facie case for a Title
IX violation and a violation of the ADA. Regarding the latter, the court
noted, "Courts have generally held that pregnancy, and pregnancy-
related complications, do not qualify as 'disabilities' uinder the Acts. Cir-
cumstances do exist, however, where pregnancy-related complications
form the basis for a 'disability' finding under the ADA, 66 The court then
held that whether the pregnancy-related complications constituted a
disability was a fact issue for the jury.67 Last, the court noted a circuit
split regarding whether Title IX supplanted 42 U.S.C. § 1983 ("Section
1983") claims against school officials. The First, Second, Third and
Seventh Circuits had held that it did, while the Fifth, Sixth, Eighth and
Tenth Circuits had held that the same set of facts could be used to allege
both claims .6 ' The district courts in the Ninth Circuit had split, five
holding that Title IX subsumed Section 1983 suits and two holding that
it did not.70 Finally, the court agreed with the First, Second, Third and
Seventh circuits and held that Title IX supplants other suits. ~
ii. Darian v. University of Massachusetts Boston
71
Darian was a senior nursing student and was pregnant.
[U]ntil October 24, 1994, she attended clinical sessions regu-
larly, and she was a good student. She made patient visits, took
good patient notes, successfully completed the first twelve
clinical days, and received an WA on her mid-term examination.
In fact, Darian was the class secretary, a member of the Golden
66. Hogan, 2008 WL 2954245, at *4-5 (citations omitted).
67. Hogan, 2008 W~XL 2954245, at *5.
68. See Cruenke v. Seip, 225 F.3d 290, 298 (3d. Cit. 2000) ("Section 1983 imposes civil
liability upon any person who, acting under the color of state law, deprives another
individual of any tights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution or laws
of the United States. This section does not create any new substantive tights but in-
stead provides a remedy for the violation of a federal constitutional or statutory
right.").
69. Hogan, 2008 WL 2954245, at *11I n. 12 (citations omitted).
70. Hogan, 2008 WI. 2954245, at *11.
71. Hogan, 2008 V&q 2954245, at *11. In 2009, the United States Supreme Court held
in Fitzgerald v. Barnstable School Committee, 555 U.S. 246, 797 (2009), that Title LX
was not written to be an exclusive remedy and did not subsume § 1983 claims, there-
by abrogating the various circuits' decisions that held otherwise.
72. Darian v. Univ. of Mass. Boston, 980 F. Supp 77, 79 (D. Mass. 1997).
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Key National Honor Society, and had a 3.65 grade point aver-
73
age.
Darian developed complications during her pregnancy and in Oc-
tober, Darian was placed on full bed rest for one week by her
obstetrician. After the one week, she returned to her doctor who pre-
scribed partial bed rest but also indicated that she could return to class
so long as she avoided seeing patients.74 Darian missed two classes dur-
ing the week of bed rest, and her professor, O'Malley, indicated that she
could stay in the office upon her return until she could see patients, so
as to comply with the doctor's recommendation. In early November,
Darian requested and was permitted to work from home with her feet
elevated."5 One week later, Darian suffered two nights of severe pelvic
bone pain, back and hip pain, general fatigue, and queasiness. The next
day she requested to be sent home early. Professor O'Malley did not
send Darian home but sent her to a home health aid department with
no patient assignments and where her other assignments were light.
However, Darian experienced difficulty sitting and left around 11I a.m.7
That day, O'Malley called Darian and told her that the modification "is
not working out" and "this [Nursing 4 10] is a clinical, not a home study
course."7
Darian was offered the option of taking an incomplete in the clini-
cal portion of the course but completing the classroom portion. This
option would have required Darian to take the clinical in the spring and
not graduate until June 1995 rather than December 1994. Darian pro-
tested and stated that she could complete the practicumn with some
modifications. Later the same day, Darian talked with O'Malley and
expressed that she wanted to return to the clinical. O'Malley told Dari-
an that she would have to see patients and that she needed a doctor's
78note detailing her exact restrictions.
Darian and her husband then met with Dr. Winfrey, the under-
graduate program director. Darian provided Dr. Winfrey with the
requested note from her doctor that prescribed that she see only one
patient a day and not climb stairs .79 The University agreed with the phy-
sician's restrictions. They also discussed Darian's concerns that she was
being discriminated against under the ADA and what O'Malley had
73. Darian, 980 F. Supp. at 80.
74. Darian, 980 F. Supp. at 80-81.
75. Darian, 980 F. Supp. at 81.
76. Darian, 980 F. Supp. at 81.
77. Darian, 980 F. Supp. at 81.
78. Darian, 980 F. Supp. at 81-82.
79. Darian, 980 F. Supp. at 82.
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meant when commenting that Darian's return might be unsafe. Follow-
ing this meeting, Darian returned to the clinical at which O'Malley had
found a home with two patients needing care that had only one step.
Darian expressed her preference to see only one patient because of her
doctor's restrictions. At the same time, Darian agreed to make up lost
clinical time at a flu clinic that day about which O'Malley had told her.
The nature of events darkened later that morning, when in a private
meeting, O'Malley was alleged to have met with Darian, called her a
"backstabber" for discussing concerns with O'Malley's superior, and told
her that she should take an incomplete. When Darian stated that she
did not want to do this, "O'Malley criticized her by saying that she
simply did not want to find a babysitter for two days a week." Darian
returned the patient file to O'Malley, told her to find someone else, and
left in tears." Darian never returned to the clinical.
On November 21, Darian met with the dean of the school of nurs-
ing and described how she felt harassed by O'Malley's statements. They
discussed accommodations, but the dean indicated that O'Malley would
have authority to make decisions about alternative learning experiences.
The dean sent a follow-up letter to Darian stating that O'Malley was to
contact her about alternative learning experiences and make-up time. 8
The next day, Darian requested to be administratively withdrawn from
the course, but the dean rejected the request because of the timing."
During this period, Professor Dumas, the classroom portion professor,
had recommended that Darian complete the classroom portion and take
a grade of incomplete in the clinical part because of the 30 hours of
missed clinical time that she would need to make up and her physical
challenges to making up time.813 Darian received an F in the course and
filed a complaint in federal court the following April alleging violations
of the ADA, the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 ("Rehabilitation Act"), and
Title IX."4
The court held that the complications that arose from Darian 's
pregnancy did constitute a disability under the ADA or a handicap un-
der the Rehabilitation Act.8" However, the court held that "no
reasonable fact-finder could find that the University, having offered an
80. Darian, 980 F. Supp. at 82.
81. Darian, 980 F. Supp. at 83.
82. Darian, 980 F. Supp. at 83.
83. Darian, 980 F. Supp. at 83.
84. Darian, 980 F. Supp. at 84, 91.
85. Darian, 980 F. Supp. at 87. In the analysis, the court noted the Garret holding, dis-
cussed infra notes 90-93 and accompanying text.
20111 227
228 MICHIGAN JOURNAL OF GENDER & LAW [o.1:1
array of remedial measures, failed to make a reasonable accommodation
merely because it did not offer Darian what she wanted.""6
For the Title IX claim the court described that there are four ele-
ments required for a plaintiff to make a prima facie case. A plaintiff
must show by a preponderance of the evidence that: (1) she was a mem-
ber of the protected class; (2) she was performing the academic
requirements at a level well enough to meet her educator's legitimate
expectations; (3) she suffered adverse treatment; and (4) the educational
program continued to instruct and credit other students . Once a prima
facie case is shown the burden shifts to defendant, who must provide a
legitimate and non-discriminatory reason for excluding the plaintiff.
Finally, if the defendant meets this burden, the plaintiff must show that
the defendant's reason is pretext.8" The court held that Dariain could not
meet the "legitimate educational expectations of both her classroom and
her clinical professor."" Further, the court stated that "Darian's allegations
of pretext are insufficient. When pretext is an issue in a discrimination
case, the plaintiff must produce specific facts which, reasonably viewed,
tend logically to undercut the defendant's position. The plaintiff cannot
rest upon conclusory allegations, improbable inferences, and unsupport-
ed speculation. "0
d. Garrett v. Chicago School Reform Board of Trustees-
The Case With No Details
The Garrett opinion provides very few details about the fact pattern
that led to the filing of the claim. Garrett filed a three-count complaint
that alleged violations of Title IX, the ADA, the Rehabilitation Act, and
the Illinois Constitution for the school's discrimination of her based on
her pregnancy and pregnancy-related complications. 91 The defendants
had filed a 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss for the ADA and Illinois Consti-
tution claims and moved to dismiss the claim for punitive damages
under the ADA and Section 504.
86. Darian, 980 F. Supp. at 91.
87. Darian, 980 F. Supp. at 91 (citing Lipsett v. Univ. of P. R., 864 F.2d 881, 897 (1st
Cir. 1988) (holding claims under Title IX will be analyzed using the Title V11 burden
shifting analysis)).
88. Darian, 980 F. Supp. at 91.
89. Darian, 980 F. Supp. at 87.
90. Darian, 980 F. Supp. at 92 (citing Villanueva v. Wellesley Coll., 930 F.2d 124, 127
(1st Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 861 (1991)); Medina-Munz v. R. Reynolds
Tobacco Co., 896 F.2d 5, 8 (1st Cir. 1990) (emphasis added).
91. Garrett v. Chi. Sch. Reform Bd. of Trs., No. 95C7341, 1996 WL 411319 (N.D. 1ll.
July 19, 1996).
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The district court held that pregnancy-related complications could
constitute a disability under the ADA 9 2 and a handicap under Section
504 of the Rehabilitation Act," and that the full range of damages, in-
cluding monetary, were available to the plaintiff" However, the court
agreed with the defendants regarding the Illinois Constitution claims
because the section identified by Garrett did not apply to the City of
Chicago or the Board of Education. The Title IX allegation was not
challenged by the defendants' motion to dismiss and therefore not ad-
dressed in the opinion.
2. Equal Treatment Cases
There are eight Title IX cases involving parenting and/or pregnant
teens that address equal treatment. Additionally, under the appropriate
sections, I discuss five cases in which Title IX was not addressed but was
implicated. Thus, there are thirteen equal treatment cases. Four cases
involve pregnant and/or parenting students being rejected for admission
to or dismissed from membership in National Honor Society ("NHS")
chapters, two cases involve school staff administering pregnancy tests to
students, two cases address schools' parental notification policies, one
addresses admissions, two address hostile treatment claims, one address-
es allegations of coerced abortion, and one addresses a pregnant
student's expulsion from a private, nonsectarian school.
a. The Four NHS Cases
i. Wort v. Vier/ing
Wort is the first of the four National Honor Society cases.95 Wort
filed a civil rights action following her dismissal from the National
Honor Society. She was selected for membership in March 1981, be-
came pregnant in July of 1981, married in October of 1981, and was
dismissed from NHS in February 1982 "for deficiency of leadership and
character, allegedly because of her premarital pregnancy." 96 Wort won at
92. Garrett, 1996 WL 411319, at *3.
93. Garrett, 1996 WL 411319, at *3 ("The term 'disabilities' under the ADA is equiva-
lent to the term 'handicaps' under the Rehabilitation Act.") (citing Erickson v. Bd. of
Governors of State Coils, and Univs. for Northeastern 1ll. Univ., 911 F.Supp. 316,
322 (N.D. 111. 1995)).
94. Garrett, 1996 WL 41 1319, at *3.
95. Wort v. Vierling, 778 F.2d 1233 (7th Cir. 1985).
96. Wort, 778 F.2d at 1233.
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the trial court level, where the judge held that the defendants had violat-
ed Title IX and ordered the defendants to reinstate her to the NHS."7
ii. Cazares v. Barber
Cazares is the second of the four NHS cases. Here, the court found
that the plaintiff was rejected from NHS, despite being academically
qualified, due to the fact that "she was pregnant, unmarried and not
living with the father of the child.""8 The court noted that a male stu-
dent who had fathered a child and who did not live with the child's
mother was accepted into the NHS chapter. The court held that the re-
jection of the plaintiff violated Title IX and the Fifth Amendment."
9
"The victory, however, proved to be hollow: the school responded by
cancelling the ceremony and terminating its participation in the
NHS." "0
iii. Pfeiffer v. Marion Center Area School District
PfeiJffer was decided in October of 1990.'01 It has also become a
commonly cited case by scholars discussing Title IX failures in the
treatment of pregnant and parenting students. 0 2 Publicity might stem
from media coverage because, as noted in the opinion, the plaintiff ap-
peared on national and local television about the issues in this case.'O
In Pfeiffer, a former student brought suit alleging violations of Title
IX after she was dismissed from the National Honor Society because of
her pregnancy. The trial court granted summary judgment for defend-
ants, and she appealed. The Third Circuit upheld the district court
finding "that she was dismissed because of premarital sexual activity and
not because of gender discrimination. "' 0 However, the Third Circuit
97. Wort, 778 F.2d at 1234.
98. Brake, supra note 28, at 517 (describing Cazares v. Barber, No. CIV-90-0128-TUC-
ACM Slip op. (D. Ariz. May 31, 1990), affd, 959 F.2d (9th Cir. 1992).
99. Brake, supra note 28, at 517 (describing Cazares v. Barber, No. CIV-90-0128-TUC-
ACM Slip op. (D. Ariz. May 31, 1990), affd, 959 F.2d (9th Cir. 1992).
100. Brake, supra note 28, at 518.
101. Pfeiffer v. Marion CT. Area Sch. Dist., 917 F.2d 779 (3d Cir. 1990).
102. See Pillow, supra note 10; NELDA H. CAMBRON-MCCABE, MARTHA M. MCCARTHY&
STEVEN B. THOMS, PUBLIC SCHOOL L~w: TEACHERS' AND STUDENTS' RIGHTS 136,
143 (6th ed. 2009) [hereinafter PUBLIC SCHOOL LAW].
103. PJiffr, 917 F.2d at 786; see also Pillow supra at 69 (discussing publicity around this
NHS case).
104. Pfeiffer, 917 F.2d at 780.
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remanded the case to the district court for an evidentiary ruling, since
the district court had excluded testimony "by a former student who was
a male member of the chapter, that two years after Pfeiffer's dismissal,
while a senior at the high school he impregnated his girlfriend and that
he was not dismissed from the chapter."1'0 At the same time, despite the
nature of the excluded testimony, the court hinted that it did not expect
the case to be decided differently. "[W]e do not suggest that the admis-
sion of this evidence would, in and of itself, produce a result different
than that previously reached by the trial court."'1
06
The Third Circuit described the Wort holding and distinguished it
by stating that "the court in Wort declined to distinguish the sexual con-
duct from the resulting pregnancy. But the district court here did make
this distinction. The court specifically found that Pfeiffer was dismissed
not because she was pregnant but because she had engaged in premarital
activity." 0
The opinion includes a tone of approval for the NHS's approach to
defining "character." After describing the district court's factual finding
as "bolstered" by the opinion's rationale that "filaced with the task of
educating hundreds of young people, and with constant demand by the
public that the schools instill attributes of good character as part of the
educational process, the Council and the Board can scarcely be criticized
for raking the action that was taken."'08 The Third Circuit then went on
to state:
Indeed, the Supreme Court has given us express guidance in
matters relating to student conduct in public schools: The
process of educating our youth for citizenship in public
schools is not confined to books, the curriculum, and the civ-
ics class; schools must teach by example the shared values of a
civilized social order .. .109
The Third Circuit's citation to Fraser may be interpreted as indicative
of a misplaced characterization of Pfeiffer's situation. Fraser is a First
Amendment case involving a student's graduation speech, which was filled
with sexual innuendo. The Court held the speech to be outside the scope
of speech protected by the First Amendment."' In Pfeiffe'r, by contrast,
105. Pfeiffr, 917 F.2d at 783.
106. Pfeiffer, 917 F.2d at 781.
107. Pfeiffr, 917 F.2d at 784.
108. P-feiffr 917 F.2d at 785 (citations omitted).
109. Pfr4Jfer, 917 F.2d at 785 (citing Bethel Sch. Dist. v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 683
(1986)).
110. Bethel Sch. Dist., 478 U.S. at 685.
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the policies and legal requirements of Title IX are characteristically dif-
ferent from those raised in the context of the First Amendment. While
the Third Circuit's citation to Fraser simply may reference the proposi-
tion that schools are often held to have the responsibility, desire, and
legal authority to determine which behaviors shall be permitted in order
to inculcate good values, it fails to acknowledge the gender issues appli-
cable to pregnancy that were not raised by a sexually explicit student
monologue delivered at a formal public ceremony. The case is of such a
different character that the citation seems more peculiar than support-
ive, possibly indicating the court's flawed equation of one student's
pregnancy arising from private behavior-the burden of which is peculi-
arly placed upon the female-to the poor taste exhibited by student's
decision to infuse a speech at a formal graduation ceremony with sexual
innuendoes.
Despite upholding the district court on these issues, the Third Cir-
cuit overruled the district court in holding that compensatory damages
could be allowed for Title IX violations."' The Third Circuit noted that
the holding was in disagreement with the Eleventh and Seventh Cir-
cuit.112 The Third Circuit also held that Pfeiffer's constitutional claims
were "subsumed" by Title IX"' but was subsequently overruled on this
point by the United States Supreme Court.'
iv. Chipman v. Grant County School District
Chipman is the most recent of the four NHS cases. In Chipman,
the district court issued an injunction requiring NHS to invite two stu-
dents who met requirements into the chapter after NHS discriminated
against the students based upon their pregnancies in violation of Title
I .115
The court explained that the relevant part of the Title IX Regu-
lation has different language but a similar purpose to the Pregnancy
Discrimination Act ("PDA") amendments to Title VII and that the
111. P-effer, 917 F.2d at 788-89 (overruled on other grounds).
112. Pfeiffer, 917 F.2d at 788-89.
113. Pfeiffr, 917 F.2d at 789 (ciring Middlesex Cnty. Sewerage Aurh. v. Nat'l Sea Clam-
mers Ass'n, 453 U.S. 1 (198 1)).
114. Fitzgerald v. Barnstable Sch. Comm., 555 U.S. 246 (2009).
115. Chipman v. Grant Cnry. Sch. Dist., 30 F. Supp. 2d 975 (E.D. Ky. 1998). For addi-
rional discussion about Chipman see Gabrielle Morgan, "Character Standard" or Sex
Discrimination? Students' Exclusion from National Honor Society Called a Violation Of
Title IX, 14 BERKELEY WOMEN'S L.J. 116 (1999).
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PDA precedent should apply to the claim. 116 Further, the court held
that disparate impact theory was "well- recognized in pregnancy cas-
es" 117 and that under disparate impact theory, intentional
discrimination does need to be proven.' The court applied the theo-
ry and described that "the balance tips decidedly in favor of
plaintiffs.""'9 The court explained:
Although 100% of young women who are visibly pregnant or
who have had a child out of wedlock are denied membership,
as far as the record reflects, defendants' policy excludes 0% of
young women who have had such relationship but have not
become pregnant or have elected to have an early abortion."
The court found "that the defendants . .. have failed to articulate a le-
gitimate credible non-discriminatory reason for their NHS pregnancy
policy. The reasons articulated for the exclusion of the plaintiffs are
vague, conclusory and undocumented.""' Finally, the court found that
the plaintiffs had a high likelihood of success on the merits and granted
the preliminary injunction.
b. Pregnancy Tests Administered to Students
2 2
i. Villanueva v. San Marcos Consolidated Independent School District
In Villanueva, the school nurse allegedly coerced a student whom
she heard was pregnant to take a pregnancy test, which turned out to be
negative.2 2' The father of the student sued alleging Section 1983 claims
116. Chipman, 30 F. Supp. 2d. at 978.
117. Chipman, 30 F. Supp. 2d. at 978.
118. Chipman, 30 F. Supp. 2d. at 979 (citing Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States,
431 U.S. 324, 335 (1997); Hartsel v. Keys, 87 F.3d 795 (6th Cir. 1996), cer. denied,
519 U.S. 1055 (1997); McConico v. Cinocinnati Gas & Elec. Co., 114 F.3d 118
(6th Cir. 1997) (unpublished); Grant v. General Motors Corp., 908 F.2d 1303 (6th
Cit. 1990); Lynch v. Freeman, 817 F.2d 380 (6th Cit. 1987); Sharif v. N.Y. State
Educ. Dep't., 709 F. Supp. 345 (S.D.N.Y. 1989) and cases cited therein.).
119. Chipman, 30 F. Supp. 2d at 979.
120. Chipman, 30 F. Supp. 2d at 979.
121. Chipman, 30 F. Supp. 2d at 980.
122. For a thorough discussion of potential privacy rights raised by these cases, see Melissa
Prober, Note, Please Don't Tell My Parents: The Validity of School Policies Manating
Parental Notifi cation ofa Student s Pregnancy, 71 BROOK. L. REv. 577 (2005).
123. Villaneuva v. San Marco Consol. Ind. School Dist., No. A-05-CA-455LY, 2006 WL
2591082, at *I (W.D. Tex. Sept. 7, 2006).
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and state law claims. 22' The father was not able to meet the Mcnel
standard, which is required to pierce the state actor's qualified immunity
for Section 1983 purposes.12
The clear policy maker for the district was the Board, and the
plaintiff did not dispute that the pregnancy, testing policy did not take
the form of an adopted policy of the Board. 12' How ever, he alleged that
the custom of using the tests was widespread enough that constructive
knowledge could be imputed to the district.' Specifically, he described
that
the director of the PEP program, then SMHS Principal Toro,
and a few other lower-level school officials (e.g. Vogel, the di-
rector of PEP McGee, a social worker with PEP, Defendant
Eastwood, a school nurse), each located in different schools
throughout the district, were aware of the original implemen-
tation of the program and the concomitant purchase of the
128pregnancy tests.
However, the court explained that even if plaintiff's evidence showed
custom widespread enough to impute knowledge, he failed the third
part of the Moneil analysis, which requires that the "moving force" of the
policy cause the constitutional infringement. 29 The court explained:
Plaintiff does not contend (nor could he), that a program,
which makes pregnancy tests available to students who desire
them, violates the Constitution. The summary judgment evi-
dence demonstrates that the PEP program made pregnancy
tests available to students on a voluntary basis. There is no
summary judgment evidence that the program identified or
targeted students and tried to convince (or coerce) them to
take tests. 'When the implicated custom in a § 1983 suit is
124. Vilanueva, 2006 WL 2591082, at *6, *9.
125. Villanueva, 2006 WE 2591082, at '3; see Monell v. Dept. of Soc. Services, 436 U.S.
658 (1978) (requiring that a plaintiff show a policy maker, a policy, and that the
moving force of such policy is violation of constitutional rights).
126. Villanueva, 2006 'XI 2591082 at *3.
127. Villanueva, 2006 WL 2591082, at *3-'4 ("[A]n act performed pursuant to a 'cus-
tom' that had not been formally approved by an appropriate decision maker may
fairly subject a municipality to liability on the theoty that the practice is so wide-
spread to have the force of law. . .. The policy-maker must have either actual or
constructive knowledge of the alleged policy, due to its duration and frequency.")
(quoting Cox v. City of Dallas, 430 F.3d 734, 748 (5th Cir. 2005)).
128. Villanueva, 2006 WL 2591082, at '4.
129. Villanueva, 2006 WE 2591082, at *4 (quoting Monell, 436 U.S. at 694).
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constitutional on its face, it cannot support municipal liability
unless the plaintiff can demonstrate that it was imposed with
deliberate indifference to the "known or obvious consequenc-
es" that constitutional violations would result. 
1 30
Accordingly, the plaintiff was held to not meet the third part of
Monell because the program itself did not have a central aim of violating
a constitutionally protected right. Summary judgment was granted on
all the § 1983 claims against the district and the nurse in her official
capacity."
However, the § 1983 claims asserted against the nurse in her indi-
vidual capacity were allowed to proceed past summary judgment. For
such individual capacity claims, the "court evaluating a claim of quali-
fied immunity must first determine whether the plaintiff has alleged the
deprivation of an actual constitutional right at all, and if so, proceed to
determine whether that right was clearly established at the time of the
alleged violation."'13 2 The court held that a school staff person's coercive
administration of a pregnancy test to a student would violate clearly es-
tablished Fourth Amendment rights for the first part of the test.1
3
Turning to the second part of the test, whether the nurse's actions were
objectively reasonable under the law at the time, the court explained
that the facts were disputed: the nurse claimed that the student volun-
tarily took the test, while the plaintiff claimed that the nurse, "in a
closed door meeting in a school office, insisted that she take a pregnancy
test (the putative unreasonable seizure), and then caused Plaintiff's
daughter's urine to be tested with a pregnancy test kit (the putative un-
reasonable search) ."3  Since there was a material fact dispute about
whether the nurse's actions were objectively reasonable, summary judg-
ment was not granted on that claim.'
130. Villanueva, 2006 WL 2591082, at *4 (quoting Bd. of Cnty. Comm'rs of Bryan Cnty.
V. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 407 (1997)).
131. Villanueva, 2006 WL 2591082, at *5 (explaining that the claims against Nurse East-
wood in her official capacity duplicated the claims against the District).
132. Villanueva, 2006 WI. 2591082, at *6 (quoting Wilson v. Layne, 526 U.S. 603, 609
(1999)).
133. Villanueva, 2006 WL 2591082, at *7 (citing Gruenke, 225 F.3d 290, 301 (3d. Cir.
2000)).
134. Villanueva, 2006 W I 2591082, at *8.
135. Villanueva, 2006 WI. 2591082, at *8.
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ii. Gruenke v. Seip
In Gruenke, a school swim coach was alleged to have required a
student who he suspected to be pregnant to take a pregnancy test.316 The
student filed a claim alleging violations of her First and Fourth Amend-
ment rights but not Title IX. Within the alleged First Amendment
claims, she asserted violations of her right to familial privacy and viola-
tions of her right to freedom of association because the coach allegedly
instructed team members to not associate with her. The district court
granted summary judgment to the coach and school on all counts.317 On
appeal, the Third Circuit overturned the district court's grant of sum-
mary judgment to the defendant on the basis of immunity for the
Fourth Amendment § 1983 claim. The court agreed with the district
that a violation had been alleged. But it described the district court as
having "fIlloundered" as to whether the right was clearly established at
the time, and held that it was."
Regarding the allegation of violating the student's substantive due
process right to privacy, the court applied the same test as with the
Fourth Amendment claim: "whether the contours of current law put a
reasonable defendant on notice that his conduct would infringe on the
plaintiff's asserted right."' The court held that the student's version of
the facts
not only falls squarely within the contours of the recognized
right of one to be free from disclosure of personal matters, see
Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 599-600, 97 S.Ct. 869, 51
L.Ed.2d 64 (1977), but also concerns medical information,
which we have previously held is entitled to this very protec-
tion. 4
136. Cruenke v. Seip, 225 F.3d 290, 295 (3d Cir. 2000).
137. Gruenke, 225 F.3d at 295.
138. Gruenke, 225 F.3d. at 300-01 ("Merely because the Supreme Court has not yet ruled
on whether a school official's administration of a pregnancy test to a student violates
her Fourth Amendment rights does not mean the right is not clearly established.
Moreover, a review of current Fourth Amendment law in the public school context
reveals not only that the right is clearly established, but also that Seip's conduct as
alleged was objectively unreasonable.... We believe that the standard set forth in
Vernonia clearly establishes that a school official's alleged administration to a student
athlete of the pregnancy tests would constitute an unreasonable search under the
Fourth Amendment.").
139. Gruenke, 225 F.3d. at 302.
140. Gruenke, 225 F.3d. at 302-03.
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Thus the claim met the test, and the district court's grant of summary
judgment was reversed.''
However, the court upheld the district court's grant of summary
judgment for the alleged violation of a constitutional familial privacy
right.112 The court explained that although the student's parents had al-
leged a violation of their constitutional privacy rights of this family
matter, it was appropriate to uphold the district court's grant of sum-
mary judgment based on immunity because the right was not clearly
established at the time.' Regarding the claim that the coach "violated
Leah's First Amendment rights by forbidding members of his private
swim team ftom associating with Leah," the Third Circuit held that the
coach's alleged interference with Leah's interaction with other swimmers
did not violate a protected First Amendment right.'
c. Parental Notification Policies
i. Port Washing-ton Teachers 'Association v. Board of Education of the Port
Washington Union Free School District
Port Washington Teachers' Association involved motions on behalf of
teachers and third-party students for a preliminary injunction to enjoin
implementation of the district's pregnancy notification policy.' The
court denied the injunction for lack of a case or controversy because the
plaintiffs were not able to describe a student who had been negatively
affected by the policy, and the plaintiffs did not show that the policy
implicated a likelihood of success on the merits for constitutional viola-
tions, state laws, or privilege rules.416 Addressing the Article III "case or
controversy" requirement, the court found that the plaintiffs lacked
third-party standing and that the claims lacked ripeness because "only
about two (2) students per year report being pregnant at Schreiber High
141. Gruenke, 225 F.3d at 302.
142. Gruenke, 225 F.3d at 307.
143. Gruenke, 225 F.3d. at 307.
144. Gruenke, 225 F.3d. at 307-08 ("[Tlhe activity of talking to swim team members
during a swimming competition is not an individual liberty interest protected by the
First Amendment." (quoting the district court opinion, Gruenke v. Seip, No. 97-
5454, 1998 'WXL 734700, at *13 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 21, 1998))).
145. Port Wash. Teachers' Ass'n v. Bd. of Educ. of the Port Wash. Union Free Sch. Dist.,
361 F. Supp. 2d 69 (E.D.N.Y. 2005), affid, No. 04-CV1357TCPWDW, 2006 WL
47447 (E.D.N.Y. Jan. 4, 2006).
146. Port Wash. Teachers'Assln, 361 F. Supp. 2d at 77.
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School and of those teens 'nearly all' of them voluntarily report their
pregnancies to their parents. ,4
However, the court proceeded to address the merits of the case. In
this discussion, the court held that the privacy rights of pregnant stu-
dents did nor require satisfaction of the Bellotti test for mandatory
parental consent to abortion"an noe that there is "a distinction be-
tween notification of pregnancy and consent/notification to
abortion." 49 The court explained that "it is the school's unending obli-
gation to inform parents of the conditions that affect the health, safety,
and welfare of their child" 50 and clarified that the phrase in loco parentis
is not meant to "displace parents.""5 ' In the next to last paragraph the
court comments, "Should the school fail to inform the parents of a stu-
dent's pregnancy and the student in any way is physically injured
(through pregnancy complications or otherwise), it is the school that
will face civil and perhaps criminal liability."'
In the second court opinion regarding the defendants' 12(b)(6)
motions, the court applied generally the same rationale. But unlike the
opinion addressed the preliminary injunction, this opinion addressed
equal protection claims raised because the policy did not apply to male
students.153 However, while the equal protection claims center on the
discrimination of female students based upon pregnancy, at no point is
Title LX raised. The court addressed and dismissed the equal protection
claim in one paragraph stating,
Plaintiffs assert, without providing the Court with any author-
ity in support, that the Policy is unconstitutional because it
does not apply to male students who impregnate someone.
The Court has previously held that the male counterpart to a
pregnant female enjoys no constitutional protections with re-
147. Port Wash. Teachers'Ass'n, 361 F. Supp. 2d at 77.
148. Port Wash. Teachers'Ass'n, 361 F. Supp. 2d at 78 ("In Beilotti, the Supreme Court
found unconstitutional a Massachusetts statute requiring pregnant minors seeking an
abortion to obtain the consent of their parents. . .. The Court held that if the State
were to require a pregnant minor to obtain one or both parents' consent to an abor-
tion, it must also provide a judicial bypass alternative." (citing Belorti v. Baird, 443
U.S. 622,643 (1979)).
149. Port Wash. Teachers'Ass'n, 361 F. Supp. 2d at 78.
150. Port Wash. Teachers'Ass'n, 361 F. Supp. 2d at 78.
151. Port Wash. Teachers'Ass'n, 361 F. Supp. 2d at 81 (quoting Gruenke v. Seip, 225 F.3d
290 (3d Cir. 2000)).
152. Port Wash. Teachers'Ass'n, 361 F. Supp. 2d at 8 1.
153. Port Wash. Teachers' Ass'n v. Bd. of Educ. of the Port Wash. Union Free Sch. Dist.,
No. 04-CV1357TCPWDW, 2006 WL 47447 (E.D.N.Y. Jan. 4, 2006).
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spect to pregnancy. Thus, in the Court's view, the Policy does
not run afoul of the Equal Protection Clause.'
Accordingly, the court's opinion does not squarely address the
plaintiffs' claim that the student mothers are discriminated against by
the policy, but instead enigmatically dismisses the claim because of the
lack of father's rights. The plaintiffs arguably should have asserted a vio-
lation of Title IX claim alongside the equal protection claim.
ii. Holt v. Superior Court
Holt originated from the termination of a high school guidance
counselor from her position. The alleged reason was that she had refused
to obey her vice-principal's order "'to disclose the names of any and all
students who had disclosed to [her] that they were pregnant . .. [and] to
insist in her counseling sessions with any pregnant students that they
transfer out of the regular high school and into Somerset,' a program
allegedly inferior to the one at Bellflower High School."' Holt further
alleged that "the vice-principal told Holt the reason for the request was
because the school board did not want pregnant girls on the school
campus, and they had adopted a policy of transferring pregnant students
out of the regular school program."' 5 6 Following these actions, Holt al-
leged that she had contacted the California Department of Education out
of concern that the request was illegal and that the Department confirmed
that it was. After Holt expressed to the principal and vice-principal that
she believed that the school's program violated state and federal law, she
was told that her employment would not continue the next school year.
Holt then sued arguing that her termination was illegal because it
was in retaliation for her refusal to follow an illegal policy. She alleged,
among other things, that the directive related to transferring pregnant
students violated Title IX. 11
7
The state trial court granted the defendants' demurrer based upon
the district's participation in the Cal-SAFE program and held that the
defendants' action did not violate public policy.' Holt filed a petition
challenging the trial court's ruling, and the Second Circuit Court of Ap-
peals for California held that by considering that the school district was
154. Port Wash. Teachers'Ass'n, 2006 WL 47447, at *7 (citations omitted).
155. Holt v. Super. Ct., No. B157647, 2002 WL 1399106, at *1 (2d Cit. June 28,
2002).
156. Holt, 2002 WL 1399106, at*I
157. Holt, 2002 WL 1399106, at*I
158. Holt, 2002 WL 1399106, at *2.
20111 239
240 MICHIGAN JOURNAL OF GENDER & LAW [o.1:1
a participating member of Cal-SAFE program, the trial court considered
facts outside the pleadings and improper at stage of demurrer. The Cali-
fornia Second Circuit Court directed the trial court to overrule the
demurrer and correct the error.'
The state circuit court's opinion suggests that the school's participa-
tion in the Cal-SAFE program made the practice and policies legal,
despite the plaintiff's allegations of Title IX violations and Title IX's lan-
guage requiring that pregnant students should voluntarily choose to
attend an alternative school. Specifically, the court quotes a section of
the Education Code that "embodies th~e] state's public policy concern-
ing students."'60 In footnote 2, the court describes that,
Education Code section 54741 provides . . .. "'The Legisla-
ture hereby finds and declares all of the following: ...
School-based programs for pregnant and parenting teens and
their children offering a wide range of educational and sup-
portive services, including child care and transportation,
which begin during pregnancy and continue after childbirth,
have been successful in increasing school enrollment and high
school graduation rates, and reducing the incidence of low
birth weight babies and repeat pregnancies..."
Section 54742 provides, in relevant part: "(a) It is the intent of
the Legislature to establish a comprehensive, continuous, and
community linked school-based program that focuses on
youth development and dropout prevention for pregnant and
parenting pupils and on child care and development services
for their children . ..
Thus, the opinion discusses the parental notification program only
in the context of the state's Cal-SAFE program and fails to address the
potential Title IX violations due to the notification policy's application
to mothering, and not fathering, students.
d. Tingley-Kelley v. Trustees of the University of Pennsylvania
In Tingley-Kelley, the court denied summary judgment to the Uni-
versity defendants for plaintiff's claims that the veterinary school's
159. Holt, 2002 WL 1399106, at *3.
160. Holt, 2002 WL 1399106, at *3.
16 1. Holt, 2002 WL 1399106, at *4 n. 2 (CAL. EDUC. CODE %§ 54741- 42).
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admissions procedures discriminated against her based upon her status
as a mother and thereby violated Title IX." The court began the opin-
ion by acknowledging that in the highly competitive process of applying
to veterinary school at the University of Pennsylvania, "[ilt would seem
that an applicant alleging that she was denied admission because of her
gender would face a daunting task inasmuch as there are almost always
... legitimate reasons for favoring one well-qualified applicant over an-
other. But when a plaintiff presents direct evidence sufficient to support
allegations of discriminations, the case must be left to a jury to de-
cide."0
6 3
Specifically, Tingley-Kelley alleged that the university had commit-
ted gender discrimination by "stereotyping her as a busy mother of
young children who would have a difficult time handling both graduate
school and her childcare responsibilities.""6' Questions during her appli-
cation review process supported the allegation as did notations on the
review forms.' Such comments included, "'concerns about how she'll
do in school esp. w/family, etc' and it 'will be a tough row to hoe'...
[and] that Ms. Tingley-Kelley had 'a lot on her plate.' ,166 The court sur-
veyed other courts and observed that such comments had been sufficient
to overcome summary judgment even without evidence of similarly sit-
uated males. Citing language from Buck v. Hastings On the Hudson
Union Free School District, the court noted that "stereotyping of women
as caregivers can by itself and without more be evidence of an impermis-
sible, sex based motive."'167 The court held that comparative evidence
was relevant but not necessary and that the issue was whether the plain-
tiff individually suffered discriminatory treatment.' 6 8 Finding that
Tingley-Kelley had provided direct evidence of discrimination, the vet-
erinary school's proffered evidence of her supposed inferior
qualifications was insufficient to shift the burden to her to show pretext,
and she survived summary judgment.1
6
,
162. Tingley-Kelleyv. Trs. of the Univ. of Pa., 677 F. Supp. 2d 764 (E.D. Pa. 2010).
163. Tingley- Kelley, 677 F. Supp, 2d. at 768.
164. Tingley- Kelly, 677 F. Supp, 2d. at 777.
165. Tingley- Keley, 677 F. Supp, 2d.
166. Tingley- Kelley, 677 F. Supp, 2d. at 772-78.
167. Back v. Hastings on the Hudson Union Free Sch. Dist., 365 F.3d 107, 122 (2d Cir.
2004).
168. Tingley-Kelly, 677 F. Supp. 2d at 779.
169. Tingley-Kelley, 677 F. Supp.2d at 780.
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e. The Vindictive/Hostile Treatment cases
i. Ivan v. Kent State University
In Ivan, Ivan was a full scholarship student in a MA./Ph.D. pro-
gram. She informed her clinical practicumn supervisor in summer of
1991 that she was pregnant and expecting a child in December. She
asked for relief from the practicumn for the fall 1991 semester only.7 0
After giving birth in December, she returned to her studies for the
spring 1992 semester but did not receive a practicumn assignment. She
asked her pracricum supervisor, Akamatsu, about the lack of assignment,
and he was alleged to have expressed his
concern that she would do a "half-assed job"'"' with her clients
because of her childcare responsibilities. Nonetheless, Akamat-
su then assigned Ivan to a clinical practicumn supervised by a
psychology professor, Neal, but assigned [Ivan] cases on a
gradual basis so that [h~e could monitor the impact, if any, of
her newborn on her ability to perform in practicum.1
7
1
Ivan was also required to meet with her supervisor weekly so that he
could monitor any impact that her motherhood was having on her
performance.' Ivan's experience of receiving practicumn responsibilities
on a gradual basis was distinct from the experience of a male colleague
whose wife had a baby at a similar time. 17
In April 1992, Ivan received an evaluation indicating the faculty's
belief that she needed an additional year of practicumn experience before
community placement. Ivan received an IP (in progress) for the spring
semester practicumn grade but received a letter advising her that she
could receive a grade of satisfactory if she showed continued improve-
ment in the summer and fall practicumn. '~ The letter noted that faculty
described her performance as "very marginal" and indicated concern
170. Ivan v. Kent State Univ., 863 F. Supp. 581, 583 (N .D. Ohio 1994).
171. Ivan, 863 F. Supp. at 584; see also Ivan v. Kent State Univ., No. 94-4090, 1996 U.S.
App. LEXIS 22269, at *1 (6th Cir. July 26, 1996) (characterizing Ivan's interactions
with her supervisor as, "Dr. Akamnatsu expressed concern that Plaintiff would do an
inadequate job with her clinical patients due to fatigue and distraction caused by car-
rying, delivering and caring for a baby.").
172. Ivan, 863 F. Supp. at 583.
173. Ivan, 1996 U.S. LEXIS 22269, at* *1.
174. Ivan, 1996 U.S. LEXIS 22269, at *1.
175. Ivan, 863 F. Supp. at 583-84.
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about the progress of her master's thesis, the topic for which she had




Ivan filed a claim alleging that the defendants had discriminated
against her in assigning the IP grade and that as a result of the grade she
lost her employment as a graduate assistant at the University. The court
177applied the McDonnell burden shifting test for the Title IX claim and
found that although Ivan had pled a prima facie claim, she had failed to
respond to the "Defendant's proffered legitimate reasons for adverse
,,178
treatment.
The Sixth Circuit upheld the decision. The court, like the district
court, applied the McDonnell burden-shifting approach to the Title IX
claim and stated, "[IT]he evidence of the universitys disparate, and alleg-
edly more favorable treatment, treatment of a male colleague with a
newborn is legally insufficient to support her contention that she was adis-
criminated against because of her female sex. ,1
79
Oi.lojo v. Kennedy-King College
Olojo involved claims that Badejoko Olojo was treated poorly and
discriminated against based upon her pregnancy.180 Olojo did not origi-
nally file Title IX claims but requested leave to amend the complaint
and include a Title LX claim. Despite pleading failures, the court dis-
cussed the likelihood of success of a Title LX claim.
Olojo was enrolled as a full-time nursing student at Kennedy-King
nursing school. She alleged that the discriminatory treatment began af-
ter she was late to class due to a flat tire, which led to a conversation
with her instructor, Ms. Montgomery, during which Ms. Montgomery
asked Olojo why her palms were white and Olojo explained that she was
pregnant." Ms. Montgomery allegedly then asked Olojo if she "liked
her husband and whether she would like to use contraception to termi-
nate the pregnancy" and when Olojo replied that she could not
terminate her pregnancy, Ms. Montgomery "then 'ordered' Olojo to sign
176. Ivan, 863 F. Supp. at 584.
177. Ivan, 863 F. Supp. at 586 ("[T]he Sixth Circuit has not addressed burdens of proof
in a Title IX claim. Two Circuits have found the McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green
standard applies in Title IX cases similar to Ivan's." (citing Andriakos v. Univ. of S.
Ind., 19 F.3d 21 (7th Cir. 1994); Lipsett v. Univ. of P.R., 864 F.2d 881 (1st Cit.
1988)).
178. Ivan, 863 F. Supp. at 586.
179. Ivan, 1996 U.S. App. LEXI S 22269, at *10 (emphasis added).
180. Olojo v. Kennedy-King Coil., No. 05 C 6234, 2006 V& 1648441 (N.D. Ill. June 7,
2006).
181. Olajo, 2006 WL 1648441, at *2.
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a non-exemption form, consenting to participate in and be exposed to
the same demands as her non-pregnant peers." 
182
Olojo needed a 78% on a final exam in the course to meet the
graduation requirements, but she only scored a 76.6%. As a result, Ms.
Montgomery proposed that Olojo, along with two other students whose
scores did not meet the minimum, teach nursing 101 students in ex-
change for extra credit. All three classmates did so, but Ms.
Montgomery allegedly gave the other students the extra credit promised
and denied it to Olojo. Olojo alleged that she reported Ms. Montgom-
ery's behavior to the college and that the college did not take action.'
Because she did not pass, Olojo had to repeat Advanced Nursing Sur-
gery and did not graduate with her class.
Olojo filed claims alleging violations under the First Amendment and
pregnancy discrimination under the Equal Protection Clause, the Pregnan-
cy Discrimination Act, Title VII, the ADA, and the Illinois Human Rights
Act, along with tort claims for Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress
due to religious and pregnancy discrimination, and retaliation claims. The
defendants filed a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6).
The court held that Olojo's pregnancy was not a disability for pur-
poses of the ADA, citing Olojo's admission in her response that her
pregnancy "did not impair or substantially limit a major life activity, nor
did it impair her ability to do her class work . . When the court
granted Olojo leave to amend her complaint to include Title IX claims,
the court characterized the claims as unlikely to be successful, stating
"Although it appears unlikely, we could not say with certainty that Olojo
cannot state a claim under Title IX, thus she is entitled to an opportuni-
ty to amend the complaint."
85
The court granted the defendants' motion to dismiss on the Equal
Protection claims. First, the court explained that "I[iln sum, Olojo alleg-
es that Ms. Montgomery intentionally and vindictively treated her
differently than similarly situated classmates for irrational, malicious,
and discriminatory reasons. Plaintiff does not allege that the other simi-
larly situated students were outside of her protected class (either male,
non-pregnant . . .).,,'1 In addition to this fatal flaw, 87 the court ex-
182. Olojo, 2006 "XL 1648441, at *2.
183. Olojo, 2006 WL 1648441, at *4 n.6.
184. Olojo, 2006 WL 164844 1, at *3 n.3. See also Garrett v. Chi. Sch. Reform Bd. of Trs.,
No. 95 C 7341, 1996 WI. 411319 (N.D. III July 19, 1996) (distinguishing pregnan-
cy itself from pregnancy related symptoms that meet ADA definition for disability).
185. Olojo, 2006 XVII 1648441, at *4.
186. Olojo, 2006 WI. 1648441, at '4.
187. But see Tingley-Kelley v. Trs. of the Univ. of Pa., 677 F.Supp.2d 764, 778 (E.D. Pa.
2010), discussed supra note 163.
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plained that the college could not be held vicariously liable for Ms.
Montgomerys actions under § 1983 for failure to meet the Monell
standards.'"8 In the discussion of the requirements to defeat the defend-
ants' claims for immunity, the court stated that even if the court found
that the college's alleged failure to take action after Olojo informed them
of Ms. Montgomery's behavior to be ratification, Olojo failed to show
that the person with whom she spoke had final policymnaking authority
for Monell standards.' 89
f. The Coerced Abortion Case
i. Arnold v. Board of Education ofEscambia County
Arnold involved claims by a high-school-aged mother and father
that school officials had coerced the mother into having an abortion.'"
The plaintiffs asserted § 1983 claims for violations of their First, Thir-
teenth, and Fourteenth amendment rights, as well as civil conspiracy
claims, but they did not allege Title IX violations. On review of the dis-
trict court's grant of the defendants' 12(b)(6) motions to dismiss, the
Eleventh Circuit considered the facts as alleged by the complaint.' 9 '
Therein, the students, Jane and John Doe, alleged that they had learned
that Jane was pregnant and soon after, the school guidance counselor
had called Jane to her office and then John, who admitted paternity. The
counselor then provided a school-purchased pregnancy test for Jane,
which returned positive. The counselor then notified another counselor,
and the two were alleged to have then coerced the students to abort the
child.' 92 The students also alleged that the school paid them to perform
tasks so that they could earn the money necessary to obtain an abortion
188. Under § 1983, in order to state a claim for municipal liability, a plaintiff must "allege
that '(1) the [municipality] had an express policy that, when enforced, causes a con-
stitutional deprivation; (2) the [municipality had a widespread pracrice that . .. is so
permanent and well settled as to constitute a custom or usage within the force of law;
or (3) plaintiffs constitutional injury was caused by a person with final policy making
authority."' Olojo, 2006 WL 1648441, at *5 (citing Alcala v. Toatro, No. 05 C 3683,
2005 WL 3470293 (N.D. III Dec. 16, 2005)).
189. Olojo, 2006 'WE 1648441, at *4 (quoting Monell v. Dep't of Social Serv. of City of
New York, 436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978) ("We conclude, therefore, that a local govern-
ment may not be sued under 1983 for an injury inflicted solely by its employees or
agents.")).
190. Arnold v. Bd. of Educ. of Escarnbia Cnry. 880 F.2d 305 (11 th Cit. 1989); Arnold v.
Bd. of Educ. of Escambia County 754 F. Supp. 853 (S.D. Ala. 1990).
191. Arnold, 880 F.2d at 308.
192. Arnold, 880 F.2d at 308-09.
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and that the school paid $20 to the person who drove the students to
the abortion clinic.1
93
The Eleventh Circuit reversed in part, holding that Jane stated a
§1983 claim for violation of her rights under the Equal Protection
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment 9 th asserted privacy rights
regarding her decision whether to bear a child, and the parents' rights to
direct the upbringing of their children-'
95 and free exercise rights.'96
The court held that John Doe had sufficiently stated a claim of violation
of his free exercise rights' 97 and his Fourteenth Amendment Equal Pro-
tection rights.'98
On remand, the district court granted the defendants' motions for
summary judgment after the plaintiffs failed to respond to the defend-
ants' motion for summary judgment, despite the court's letter sent in
advance reminding the plaintiffs of their need to respond.'99 The plain-
tiffs' failure to respond was interpreted, per the rules, to be an admission
that no material factual dispute existed. 00 Accordingly, the district
court's fact findings were based upon the defendant's assertions, which
the plaintiffs were interpreted as having admitted as true, and summary
judgment was granted to the defendants on all counts.
g. The Private Religious School Case
i. Hall v. Lee College, mnC.
0'
Melissa Hall was suspended from the private and religious institu-
tion of Lee College after becoming pregnant in violation of the school's
policy that prohibits premarital sex. This was Hall's second baby while a
student at Lee College, and the college had taken no action against her
for the first pregnancy. 0 After Hall received a letter requiring suspen-
sion or offering options of withdrawal, she filed a claim alleging Title IX
violations.
When Hall entered the college, she was provided a handbook that
stated that "students who engage in sexual immorality whether premari-
193. Arnold, 880 F.2d at 309.
194. Arnold, 880 F.2d at 317.
195. Arnold, 880 F.2d at 310-13.
196. Arnold, 880 F.2d at 314.
197. Arnold, 880 F.2d at 314-15.
198. Arnold, 880 F.2d at 317.
199. Arnold, 754 F. Supp at 854.
200. Arnold, 754 F. Supp at 854.
201. Hall v. Lee Coll., Inc., 932 F. Supp. 1027 (E.D. Tenn. 1996).
202. Hall, 932 F. Supp. at 1030.
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tal, or homosexual, will be expelled from the college.""' 3 The court
found that the handbook did not discriminate on its face as it applied
on its face to both sexes. Additionally, the court held that no similarly
situated students that were treated differently had been brought to the
court's attention .2 0' The court disagreed with Hall regarding a male stu-
dent, John Doe, who Hall alleged was similarly situated, for three
reasons:
[Olne, Brian Conn married his then pregnant girlfriend, so he
was allowed to reenter school the next semester; two, because
of the familial relationship with the college president, there is a
possibility of considerations other than sex playing a role; and
three, Brian Conn's girlfriend, also a Lee College student, re-
ceived identical letters of suspension and readmission upon
their marriage.
05
The court did not address the fact that Hall did not receive a letter
offering a marriage option. Her letter only offered two options: she
could voluntarily withdraw and receive all W's, or she could withdraw
from all coursework except one required class, which she could complete
on an independent basis, but she should not visit the campus until after
her baby was born. 0 The court held that Hall did not meet her burden
under Title IX to show that a violation of discrimination had oc-
curred. 0  The Court never addressed whether the school met the
requirement under § 106.12 that religious institutions must provide
written paper-work to claim an exemption to Title IX.20
B. Case Law Evaluation
The cases that have asserted the rights of pregnant and parenting
students illuminate how the courts are interpreting the rights of these
students, including what accommodation means and what equal treat-
ment means to pregnant and parenting students under Title MX. It
should be noted generally that more than half of the cases were decided
in favor of students, including three out of the five accommodation
203. Hall, 932 F. Supp. at 1029.
204. Hall, 932 F. Supp. at 1031.
205. Hall, 932 F. Supp. at 1032.
206. Hall, 932 F. Supp. at 1030.
207. Hall, 932 F. Supp. at 1033.
208. See supra note 2 1.
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cases and seven of the thirteen equal treatment cases. Additional key
points and trends are discussed under categories below.
1. Trends
a. Failure to Assert Title IX
As discussed, five of the eighteen cases did not even allege Title IX
violations despite fact patterns that supported such claims . Of those
five, only Olojo requested leave to amend the complaint to include a Ti-
tle IX claim .2 " The failure to assert Title IX claims illustrates a failure in
awareness of Title IX despite the clear rights-granting language. The
failure to allege Title IX violations has a significant impact on the viabil-
ity of pregnant and parenting students' claims because Title IX grants
protections specific to students in these situations and identifies imper-
missible conduct. For example, the Olojo court, while granting
defendants' motions to dismiss the Equal Protection claims,"' 1 allowed
leave to amend the complaint to attach a Title IX claim. At the same
time, the Halt court's failure to acknowledge the clear import of the
Title IX prohibitions is problematic and illustrates unawareness similar
to that illustrated by the attorneys who fail to assert the claims. 1
b. Pregnancy and Character
While three out of the four NHS cases held the prohibition of stu-
dents due to their status as a pregnant or parenting student violated
Title IX, the one that did not, Pfeiffer, is still good law in the Third Cir-
cuit (excepting the portion that held Title IX subsumed § 1983
claims). 1  Furthermore, the Pfeiffer opinion explicitly acknowledged and
disagreed with the Seventh Circuit's in Wart.1
209. Gruenke v. Seip, 225 F.3d 290 (3d Cit. 2000); Arnold v. Bd. of Educ. of Escambia
Cnty., 880 F.2d 305 (11 th Cir. 1989); Villaneuva v. San Marco Consol. Indep. Sch.
Dist., No. A-05-CA-455LY, 2006 WL 2591082 (W.D. Tex. Sept. 7, 2006); Olojo v.
Kennedy-King Coll., No. 05 C 6234, 2006 WL 1648441 (N.D. 111. June 7, 2006);
Port Wash. Teachers' Ass'n v. Bd. of Educ. of the Port Wash. Union Free Sch. Dist.,
361 F. Supp. 2d 69 (E.D.N.Y. 2005).
210. Olojo, 2006 Wi. 164844 1, at *4.
211. See supra notes 186-189 and accompanying text.
212. See infra note 219 and accompanying text.
213. See supra note 114 and accompanying text.
214. Pfeiffer v. Marion Ctr. Area Sch. Dist., 917 F.2d 779, 784 (3d Cit. 1990).
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c. Hostile/Vindictive Treatment
In Ivan and Olojo, the Sixth Circuit and federal district court in Il-
linois found that plaintiffs had made prima facie cases for
discrimination, but in both, the plaintiffs were unable to meet the bur-
den of showing that the schools' proffered reasons for their actions were
pretext. 1 It should be noted that Ivan was litigated alleging Title IX
violations and Olojo alleged Equal Protection violations. However, when
the court in Olojo granted the plaintiff's request for leave to add a Title
IX claim, it doubted the likelihood of success .21 " Thus, while Olojo tech-
nically represents a victory for the student because the claim was allowed
to continue for amendment, the Olojo opinion is largely unsympathetic
and unreceptive towards the student's claims of discriminatory treat-
ment on the basis of pregnancy. Given that both Ivan and Olojo
included allegations of language of university actors that explicitly refer-
enced the students' pregnancies combined with the different treatment
of fathering students, these opinions call into question the feasibility of
surviving the burden-shifting approach in these claims. In comparison,
Tingley-Kelley considered such statements, albeit with written evidence,
to be direct evidence and that evidence of pretext was no longer neces-
sary to avoid summary judgment under the burden-shifting analysis.
d. Parental Notification Policies
Under the language of the Title IX Regulations, parental notifica-
tion policies that apply only to mothers should be held to violate Title
IX. 117 The two cases addressing such policies, however, have not
acknowledged the gender discrimination implicit in mother-only notifi-
cation policies. Although Port Washing-ton Teachers' Association was
dismissed for lack of standing, the court proceeded to address the merits
of the legal claims and noted the low probability of success for equal
protection claims on the rationale that fathers do not have constitutional
rights in such cases .2 18 Holt was remanded to the district court due to the
district court's consideration of the school's participation in a state
215. See supra notes 170-189 and accompanying text.
216. See supra note 185 and accompanying text.
217. For a discussion of the Port Washington decision, how such policies violate students'
constitutional and statutory rights, and recommendations for schools, see Melissa
Prober, Note, Please Don't Tell My Parents: The Validity of School Policies Mandating
Parental Notification ofa Student's Pregnancy, 71 BROOK. L. Ruv. 557 (2005).
218. Port Wash. Teachers'Ass'n, No. 04-CVI357TCPWDW, 2006 WL 47447 (E.D.N.Y.
Jan. 4, 2006).
24920111
250 ~MICHIGAN JOURN L OF GENDER 6- LAW [o.1:1
program at an improper stage in the proceedings, but neither court ad-
dressed the irrelevance of the state program in the context of whether
such a policy, state approved or not, violated Title LX.
21
1
e. Pregnancy Test Policies
Pregnancy tests that are administered to students have been held to
violate Title IX and/or the Fourth Amendment."
f. Recovery
Following a circuit split, the United States Supreme Court clarified
that Title IX is not the sole means of recovery, and Title IX claims may
be made alongside § 1983 claims.22' Further expanding the opportuni-
ties for legal redress, Garrett (N.D. Illinois), Hogan (9th Circuit), and
Darian (D. Mass), held that discrimination against pregnancy-related
complications experienced by students may comprise violations of the
ADA and Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act. 2 These holdings are
significant not only because students have multiple claims that may be
asserted, but also because, when pregnancy-related complications consti-
tute disabilities, they invoke the panoply of associated rights and
requirements under Section 504 .22' Also, the Rehabilitation Act of 1973
applies to both private and public schools 2 2 1 which indicates that those
students who have pregnancy-related complications that meet the defi-
nition of disability have a means of enforcing rights against secondary
private schools that receive federal funds but have been exempted from
Title IX thtough the filing of appropriate papers . 22 ' Finally, the Third
Circuit has upheld compensatory and punitive damages in Title LX cases
219. Holt v. Super. Ct., No. B 157647, 2002 WL 1399106, at *3 (2d Cit. June 28, 2002);
see supra text accompanying notes 1 55-161.
220. See supra text accompanying notes 145-154 for discussion of Port Washington.
221. See generally Fitzgerald v. Barnstable Sch. Comm., 129 S.Ct. 788, 797 (2009). For
discussion of the Circuit split before Fitzgerald, see supra notes 69-7 1 and accompa-
nying text.
222. For Garrett, see supra notes 92-93 and accompanying text; or Hogan, see supra note
66 and accompanying text; or Darian, see supra note 85 and accompanying text.
223. See PUBLIC SCHOOL LAW, supra note 102, at 188-92 (describing the Rehabilitation
Act of 1973, Section 504, and explaining schools' responsibilities).
224. PUBLIC SCHOOL LAW, supra note 102 at 188.
225. See supra note 21 and accompanying text.
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addressing rights of pregnant and parenting students despite contrary
holdings in other circui ts.
g. Deference
As with courts' genera 2 2 1 stance in other areas 2 2 1 courts continue to
try to show deference to school administrators. In Hogan, the court
notes, "Deference to a university's judgment is generally appropriate be-
cause courts are "ill-equipped," as compared with experienced educators,
to determine whether a student meets a university's "reasonable stand-
ards for academic and professional achievement. 2 1 Similarly, De la Cruz
describes the significant issue of the proper role of the judiciary in over-
seeing the decisions of school administrators 2 3 0 and Arnold emphasizes
the First Amendment rights of counselors and states "we do not seek to
curtail the beneficial use of counseling."
2
31
h. Burden Shifting Analysis
Unless plaintiffs are able to provide direct evidence, 3 the burden
shifting analysis has proven to be lethal to claims. Brake said in her 1994
Clearinghouse Review article, "Evidence is more likely to be successful it
226. See supra note 111 and accompanying text. For argument that punitive damages
should be allowed in Title IX claims, see Pohlman, Note, Have We Forgotten K-12?
The Need for Punitive Damages to Improve Title IX Enforcement, 71 U. PITT. L. Ruv.
167 (2009).
227. For a discussion of the Court's active stance in Parents Involved in Cmty Sch. v.
Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1., 127 S. Ct. 2738 (2007), see James E. Ryan, The Real Lessons
of School Desegregation, in FROM SCHOOLHOUSE TO COURTHOUSE: THE JUDICIARY'S
ROLE IN AMERICAN EDUCATION 73, 90 (Joshua M. Dunn & Martin R. West eds.,
2009).
228. See Safford Unified Sch. Dist. v. Redding, 129 S. Ct. 2633, 2643 (2009) ("The dif-
ference is that the Fourth Amendment places limits on the official, even with the high
degree of deference that courts must pay to the educator's professional judgment.");
see also Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 428 (2007) (Breyer, J., concurring in part,
dissenting in part) ("[N]o one wishes to substitute courts for school boards, or to turn
the judge's chambers into the principal's office.").
229. Hogan v. Ogden, No. Cu-06-5078-EFS, 2008 \XQ 2954245, at *5 (E.D. Wash. July
30, 2008) (citing Wong v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 192 F.3d 807, 817 (9th Cit.
1999) (citing Zulde v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 166 F.3d 1041, 1047 (9th
Cit. 1 999)).
230. De La Cruz v. Tormey, 582 F.2d 45, 47 (9th Cit. 1978).
231. Arnold v. Bd. of Educ. of Escambia County, 880 F.2d 305, 314 (11 th Cit. 1989).
232. See Tingley-Kelley v. Trs. of the Univ. of Pa., 677 F.Supp.2d 764, 776 (E.D. Pa.
2010); see also supra notes 87-88 and accompanying text.
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if includes 'smoking guns,' such as negative comments made by teachers
and school administrators directed toward teen mothers or a history of
discrimination against mothers in the school district.,2" However,
HolIt, 2" Darian2 11 Ivan,"'6 and 01oj 217 included allegations of "smoking
gun" language by instructors that proved to be insufficient to show that
the schools' proffered reasons were pretext. Only in Tingley-Kelley was
such alleged smoking-gun language helpful to survive summary judg-
ment. There, it was suggested that evidence beyond mere "say-so" would
be required for such evidence to be probative .
i. Comparability
None of the eighteen cases address the issue of the comparability
requirement. Holt tangentially raises the issue of alternative schools for
pregnant students offering a lesser quality education, 3 9 but the plaintiff
lost at the summary judgment stage. As discussed under Section 11,
"1comparability"' is an area in which the scholars agree that there is little
to no case law. Those who characterize the case law as little are correct;
however, students seeking to assert claims are not without guidance.
Brake notes that in the context of athletics, Title LX "involvels] a com-
parison of the availability, quality, and kinds of benefits, opportunities,
and treatment afforded members of both sexes. The benefits and oppor-




Brake also notes that, although nor in the specific context of pregnant
and parenting students, the court in Newberg v. Board of Public Educa-
tion, addresses the issue of single-sex schools under the Fourteenth
Amendment and found the schools to be unequal.2 "' The Newberg court
looked at "court offerings, type of degrees available, class size, teaching
qualifications, academic and recreational facilities, library resources,
availability of computers and other equipment, extracurricular activities,
student performance, average per student expenditures, and the reputa-
tions of the two schools." 42 Additionally, McNeeley argues that the
233. Brake, supra note 14. at 15 1.
234. See supra notes 155-161 and accompanying text.
235. See supra notes 72-90 and accompanying text.
236. See supra notes 170-179 and accompanying text.
237. See supra notes 180-185 and accompanying text.
238. See supra notes 164-169 and accompanying text.
239. See supra note 15 5 and accompanying text.
240. Brake, supra note 14, at 149.
241. Newberg v. Bd. of Pub. Educ., 478 A.2d 1352 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1984).
242. Brake, supra note 14, at 150 (describing Newberg, 478 A.2d 1352).
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dissent in the Fourth Circuit opinion in United States v. Virginia
(" VMT) may provide some criteria for assessing whether schools are
comparable. In the dissent, judge Phillips stated that "separate-but-equal
single-gender institutions" should only be permissible if they include
1substantially comparable curricular and extra-curricular programs,
funding, physical plant, administration and support services, and faculty
and library resources. 2 43 McNeeley notes that while VMI was decided
under heightened scrutiny under the Fourteenth Amendment, some
244
courts have hinted that Title IX claims should receive such scrutiny.
ii. Role of the First, Fourth, and Fourteenth Amendments
The case law illustrates that while Title IX serves as a centerpiece in
protecting the rights of pregnant and parenting students, other areas of
law also play a necessary role in protecting their rights. First Amend-
ment right-to-not-speak concerns and constitutional privacy concerns
are raised by school notification policies . 2 11 Schools' imposition of preg-
nancy tests raises Fourteenth Amendment due process as well as Fourth
Amendment search and seizure concerns."' While the above-discussed
cases indicate that Fourteenth Amendment equal protection claims are
more successful when alleged alongside Title IX claims, the role of the
Equal Protection Clause in protecting against treatment according to
gender should not be overlooked.
2. Importance of Recognizing the Body of Case Law and Its Contours
The presence of a coherent, consistent, and predictable body of case
law goes a long way toward aligning action by otherwise recalcitrant
groups and persons. Filing or threatening to file a case in which a dis-
trict can reasonably expect to be found to have violated a rights law, or
the filing of a case, has the potential to shift behavior without lengthy
and costly litigation. Such has been demonstrated with Title IX. For ex-
ample, the New York "P Schools" were closed by the threat of litigation.
There, in 2002, the New York Civil Liberties Union Executive Director,
Donna Lieberman, sent a letter to New York Schools Chancellor,
243. McNeeley, supra note 37, at 274 (citing United States v. Va. Military Inst., 44 F.3d
1229, 1242 (4th Cir. 1995) (Phillips J., dissenting), rev'd, 515 U.S. 518 (1996)).
244. McNeeley, supra note 37, at 274.
245 See infra Part I.B.2C.
246 See infra Part 1.13.2B.
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Harold Levy, outlining three specific complaints and calling for action
before a suit was filed .247 The three specific complaints included:
1 . A seventh grade student in Brooklyn was told by a school
counselor that she should stay at home because she was
pregnant and that her pregnancy was distracting to other
students. Making matters worse, an attendance officer
told the girl that she should permanently transfer out of
her school.
2. Takenya Tucker, a 17-year-old eleventh grader at the Lilli-
an Rashkis School of Telecommunications in Brooklyn,
has been barred from taking her baby on the school bus
with her, preventing the baby from attending the school-
based day care program ... mak~ing] it harder for Taken-
ya to stay in school.
3. Tiffany Flores, a 16-year-old student at John Jay High
School in Brooklyn enrolled her two-month-old son in
the school's LYFE day care program. Then an Assistant
Principal ordered the baby removed unless Tiffany ...
sign [ed] a contract stipulating her termination from the
LYFE program if she failed a single course. .. ."
In the 2002 letter, Lieberman outlined that the schools' policies vi-
olated the girls' legal rights and that developing policies to help the
students stay in school would not only uphold their legal rights but
would be fiscally sound .249 The 2002 letter followed earlier action by
NYCLU in 2000 in which Liebermann had contacted Chancellor Levy
and explained that "after conducting interviews with dozens of pregnant
and parenting girlsj m~] mlany of these students said that school officials
sabotaged their efforts to stay in school, or pushed them out . .. [and]
results of a telephone survey that found some schools unlawfully refused
to allow pregnant students to enroll. 2 0 Lieberman stressed that "'
schools may offer emotionally supportive environments for pregnant
students but too often lack the coursework and resources to meet their
educational needs. 2 11 In May of 2001, NYCLU representatives met
with representatives from the Board of Education to provide recoin-
247. NrYCLU Gives Schools Chancellor Lezy An YF For Failing to Stop Discrimination
Against Pregnant and Parenting Girls, Mar. 24, 2002, http://www.nyclu.org (search
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mendations. However, in 2002, the NYCLU reported their lack of
awareness of any progress and gave Chancellor Levy an "F" for failing to
address the discrimination. Finally in 2007, it was announced that the
"P Schools," which at that point had 323 students enrolled, were closing
for reorganization . Following the announcement, district Superinten-
dent Cami Anderson said, "It's a separate but unequal program. . .. The
girls get pushed out of their original high schools, they don't come to
class and they don't gain ground in terms of credits.",
2
11
Similarly, three Texas cheerleaders who were dismissed after becom-
ing pregnant were returned their status on the team after a letter from
the ACLU .254 Also, in 2004 in Southern California, the ACLU filed suit
against Antelope Valley Union High School District and the Los Ange-
les County Office of Education arguing that the schools' policies for
pregnant and parenting teens amounted to coercion .2 ' Students had to
choose between the traditional high school or alternative school. The
traditional high school offered college preparatory courses but did not
have childcare services. In contrast, the alternative school had childcare
but did not offer any college preparatory services. For students who
needed childcare, the offerings did not really allow any choice at all .~
The case settled before trial and no precedent was created. This and the
two previous situations illustrate that the awareness of enforceable rights
facilitates improved practices without costly and time-consuming full-
length litigation.
11. ANALYZING THE IMPLEMENTATION
The above situations indicate that while the case law on the topic
of pregnant and parenting teens is severely disproportionate to the
number of parenting and pregnant teens affected by the failures in im-
plementation, there is a body of case law that provides guidance, albeit
limited in many ways, and can be relied upon by those asserting rights.
252. Jlie Bosman, New York's Schools for Pregnant Girls Will Close, N.Y. TIMES, May 24,
2007, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2007/05/24/education/24educ.html.
253. Id
254. Gabrielle Morgan, "Character Standard" or Sex Discrimination? Students' Exclusion
from National Honor Society Called a Violation of Title IX, 14 BERKELEY WOMEN'S
L.J. 116, 122 (1999).
255. ACL U/SC Files Suit On BehalfOf Pregnant And Parenting Teens Who Were Funneled
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At the same time, schools that seek to comply with Title IX may
encounter hardships when seeking information for compliance. For ex-
ample, the earlier-mentioned pamphlet created and distributed by the
Office for Civil Rights in 1991 for "elementary and secondary adminis-
trators, teachers, counselors, parents, and students" discussing Title IX
requirements 5 in this context fails to provide clarity for the legal re-
quirement of Title IX, instead stating twice that " [t~hese approaches and
programs, however, are not legal requirements under Title IX."2 11 Addi-
tionally, although a Women's Educational Equity Act Program
("WEEA") 2002 report gave the OCR a C+ for its enforcement of Title
IX regulations for pregnant and parenting students, 5 the OCR has not
updated the pamphlet, despite WEEAs call for improvement and its
own acknowledgment that the pamphlet is our of date. 6
A. Lack of Knowledge
Research has indicated that school administrators are commonly
unaware of the legal requirements that apply to the education of these
students.2 Yet, such knowledge is crucial for securing affected students'
rights. "The ability of pregnant athletes to realize Title IX's promised
protection from discrimination will depend on these students'
knowledge of their rights and their willingness to assert them." 22pill ow
describes a lack of knowledge by all parties: "In my research, I have
found that few education students and personnel, as well as the teen
mothers I have interviewed, know that under Title IX pregnant and
mothering students have the right to equal education opportunity. (Pil-
low, 2006, p. 62)." Brittany Ducker and Madeline McNeeley also
describe a lack of Title IX knowledge by school districts and students. 6
257. See supra note 9 and accompanying text.
258. OFFICE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS, supra note 9, at 2; see also id. at 8.
259. LUTTRELL, supra note 14, at 2 1.
260. E-mail from David A. Campbell, Customer Serv. and Tech. Team, Office for Civil
Rights, to author (Apr. 26, 2010, 14:37 EST) (on file with author).
261. MARGARET A. NASH & MARGARET DUNKLE, THE NEED FOR A WARMING TREND: A
SURVEY OF THE SCHOOL CLIMATE FOR PREGNANT AND PARENTING TEENS (Equality
Ctr. 1989) (describing how school administrators were unaware of Title IX require-
ments for pregnant and parenting students and describing violations); Brake, supra
note 14 (describing research indicating continued violations of Title IX fot pregnant
and parenting students); Brake, supra note 1 at 361 (stating that realization of rights
for pregnant and parenting students often depends on school administrators and that
administrators' knowledge "often leaves much to be desired").
262. Brake, supra note 1 at 362.
263. See Ducker, supra note 6; MeNeeley, supra note 37.
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Katrina Pohlman describes a lack of knowledge coupled with disinterest:
"What was perhaps even more troubling than the study's depiction of
inequality was the clear disinterest in reform. Only 49 of the 129
schools were able to name their Title IX coordinators, which schools are
required to have by federal law. "2 6' Additionally, my own research has
shown that the Indiana Department of Education was unable to provide
any contact information about the state's district Title IX coordina-
tors. 2 6 1 Yet, awareness of the relevant actors of the policy being
266
implemented is germane to a policy's implementation.
Teachers' and principals' lack of awareness of education-related laws
can be connected to the fact that "separate courses in education law at
the undergraduate level are the exception rather than the ru le.",26 1 Most
teacher and administrator preparation programs do not require School
Law or Legal Perspectives courses. A study published in the Harvard
Educational Review that surveyed over 1,300 teachers in several states
showed that 75% of the participating teachers had not taken a school
law course. 6 In striking contrast, research indicates that throughout the
nation, teachers and administrators want to develop legal knowledge. In
2004, a national survey showed that 82% of public school teachers and
77% of public school principals practiced "defensive teaching," which
meant teaching designed "to avoid legal challenges. 2 9 This information,
taken together, indicates thatr teachers asnd administrators are nor in-
formed of whether their actions that aim to avoid legal violations
actually align with legal requirements. These acts of defensive teaching
that are made without a knowledge basis are likely to frustrate rather
than facilitate educational processes, and unlikely to prevent the very
legal challenges that they are designed to avoid.
264. Katrina A. Pohlman, Note, Have We Forgotten K-12? The Need for Punitive Damages
to Improve Title IX Enforcement, 71 U. PITT. L. Ray. 167, 167-68 (2009).
265. E-mail from Risa Regnier, Ind. Dept. of Educ., to author (Nov. 30, 2009, 14:14
EST) (on file with author).
266. For discussion of the crucial component of understanding in the change process, see
MICHAEL FULLAN, THE NEW MEANING OF EDUCATIONAL CHANGE 34-37 (4th ed.
2007).
267. Perry A. Zirkel, Education Law Course Offerings in Law Schools, 33 J.L. & EDUC. 327,
329 (2004).
268. David Schimmel & Matthew Militello, Legal Literacy for Teachers: A Neglected Re-
sponsibility, 77 HARV. EDUC. REv. 257, 262 (2007).
269. Martin R. West & Joshua M. Dunn, The Supreme Court as School Board Revisited, in
FROM SCHOOLHOUSE TO COURTHOUSE: THE JUDICIARY'S ROLE IN AMERICAN EDU-
CATION 3 (Joshua M. Dunn & Martin R. West eds., 2009).
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Additionally, students themselves and their parents are frequently
unaware of their rights. 70 As reported by the National Women's Law
Center ("NWVLC"),
[Alvailable research suggests that schools make a difference in
whether pregnant and parenting students remain in school.
According to the Gates Foundation report ... those who left
.. [were] "most likely to say that they would have worked
harder if their schools would have demanded more of them
and provided the necessary support. ... EMlany pregnant stu-
dents dropped out because they were "unable to juggle" the
demands of school and parenthood and seemed unaware of
any assistance at their schools that might have helped them
ease their burden.27
If the adults around them do not know of the existence of these
rights, it seems almost axiomatic that the students themselves do not.
Futthet, as discussed in the next section, the discourse surrounding
pregnant and parenting students deemphasize these rights.
B. Marginaization
Several discourses shape society's understanding of school-aged
mothers. 7 Discourses are relevant to the discussion of the implementa-
tion of Title LX Regulations because they impact the politics and power
of a law or policy]731
270. Pillow, supra note 10, at 62; see also McNeely, supra note 37, at 276 ("[Mlost of these
girls and their parents are unaware that Title IX protects pregnant and parenting stu-
dents, so they do not pursue their potential claims"); NWLC, supra note 7.
271. NWLC, supra note 7, at 14.
272. Brake supra nott 1 at 364. For a thorough discussion of the history and context of
teen pregnancy and education, see Pillow, supra note 10; see also Fershee, supra note
14. For a discussion of the history and context of New York Public School policy and
pregnant students, see Ling, supra note 28. For a discussion of the history and context
specific to Texas, see Hausenfluck, supra note 11.
273. Lisa Rosen, Rhetoric and Symbolic Action in the Policy Process, in HANDBOOK OF EDU-
CATIONAL POLICY REsEARCtH 267, 283 (2009) ("The process of problem construction
is also intrinsically political. This is not only because individuals hold different views
of the same condition and compete to have their own views prevail, but also because
how a problem is defined shapes understandings of its causes."); see also Bradley A. U.
Levinson et al., Education Policy as a Practice of Power: Theoretical Tools, Ethnographic
Methods, Democratic Options, 23 EDUC. POL'Y 767, 771 ("In every instance, policy
formation is best conceived as a practice of wielding power."); Betty Malen, Revisiting
Policy Implementation as a Political Phenomenon: The Case of Reconstitution Policies, in
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Pillow explains how the teen mother was once portrayed as the
"Girl Next Door" in order to drum up support for policy initiative for
her benefit. However, in the eighties, that discourse was replaced by
"The Teen Mother as the 'Other Girl' through which the teen mother
was connected to the welfare mother 2 " and as "immoral, irresponsible,
and a drain on society. 27" Linda McClain describes the "single-mother,"
the "welfare-mother," and the "teen mother," and "Further Costs of Irre-
sponsible Reproduction" as four parts of the discourse of irresponsible
reproduction.27
These discourses have prevailed such that school-aged mothers are
viewed as irresponsible and deficient, and descriptions of them include
words such as "immorality, unaccountability, and incapacity., 2 77 The
federal push for abstinence-only sex education is a result, an illustration,
and a furtherance of these discourses. 7
Thus, we see the legal requirements of Title IX as contrasting with
and derogated by public sentiment that views current and expectant
mothers as irresponsible 2 79 detrimenta, 2 10 contaminating society,2 1 Ian
NEw DIRECTIONS IN EDUCATION POLICY IMPLEMENTATION: CONFRONTING COM-
PLExiTY 83, 96 (Meredith 1. Honig ed., 2006) ("And, as many maintain, education
systems are comprised of people with different preferences and priorities and relevant
albeit unequal power bases that can be deployed to influence policy developments.");
Malen, supra, at 99 ("Redistributive policies that challenge prevailing ideologies and
entitlement, redefine rights and responsibilities, or otherwise alter the allocation of
power and privilege are especially susceptible to this explosive form of politics where-
in school communities can become, literally and figuratively, the battleground on
which broad sociocultural wars are fought.)
274. Pillow, supra note 10, at 28-33.
275. Idat 46.
276. Linda C. McClain, "Irresponsible" Reproduction, 47 HASTINGS L.J. 339 (1996).
277. Pillow, supra note 10, at 71.
278. Dan ielle LeClair, Let's Talk about Sex Honestly: Why Federal Abstinence-Only- Until-
Marriage Education Programs Discriminate Against Girls, are Bad Public Policy, and
Should be Overturned, 21 WIS. WOMEN'S L.J. 291, 313 (2006); see also Pillow, supra
note 10, at 177.
279. Pillow, supra note 10, at 71 (quoting McClain, "Irresponsible" Reproduction, 47 HAS-
TINGS L.J. 339, 342 (1996)).
280. Pillow, supra note 10, at 44 (describing Congressional hearings in which "[tihe teen
mother . . . is described as more likely to be uneducated, unskilled, unmarried, and
caught in a cycle of poverty").
281. Id. at 69, 98-10 1.
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epidemic, 282 deserving of shame and blame 283 and resists enabling moth-
ering students .2 4 As McClain aptly explains:
[T~he current rhetoric of irresponsible reproduction cannot
serve as an adequate basis for serious public debate about re-
production and responsibility or for changing law and public
policy. Its models are flawed, reflect a problematic gender ide-
ology and troublesome stereotypes about people in poverty,
and rely upon reductive accounts of human motivation in the
area of reproductive behavior. Even on its own terms, the
rhetoric contains significant internal tensions which compli-
cate its translation into law and public policy. Moreover, the
focus upon personal responsibility in the diagnosis of social ills
ignores issues of collective responsibility.
2 5
The discourses explain why much policy for pregnant and parent-
ing teens focuses on demographics of pregnant and parenting students
and the risks that accompany not offering equal educational opportuni-
ties to the students, risks not only for the students and their child(ren)
but for society at large.28
The "cycles" that commonly come to mind when people speak
of teen mothers are "~cycle of poverty," "cycle of welfare de-
pendency," and "cycle of child abuse." Perhaps it would be
fruitful to bear in mind, instead, a "cycle of stigma"-a cycle
helped along by experts and advocates who enforce negative
stereotypes to attract funding and support; a cycle given a spin
282. Id.
283. Luttrell, supra note 14, at 25; see also Deirdre M. Kelly, Stigma Stories: Four Discourses
About Teen Mothers, Welfare, and Poverty, 27 YOUTH & Soc'v 421, 434 (1996)
(describing the alternative media theme of "don't blame the poor for poverty and its
consequences").
284. McClain, supra note 276, at 340 ("Many voices now urge that law and public policy
should encourage, or require, personal responsibility a-nd should no longer tolerate,
much less reward, irresponsibility. A prime target in the campaign for personal respon-
sibility is procreative irresponsibility .... The cluster of behaviors and choices that have
been labeled 'irresponsible' includes, but is not limited to, 'illegitimacy,' single-parent
families, divorce, abortion, and adolescent sexual activity."); see also Pillow, supra note
10, at 40-41 (describing welfare policies built upon idea of "tough love").
285. McClain, supra note 276, at 342.
286. See NWLC, supra note 7, at 10 (describing savings to society when students gradu-
ate). This Article by no means suggests that economic stability is not a meritorious
goal but seeks to illustrate that the literature often frames discussions of educational
programs for pregnant and parenting students in terms of costs and savings and not
as a rights-centered discussion.
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by politicians who ignore their own studies in seeking scape-
goats; a cycle reinforced by a mainstream media that relays the
stigmatized images it finds . .. and largely ignores the dis-
courses of opposition and of teen mothers themselves .
The discourses of shame and blame also explain why such policies
have not been more popular and why the funding for such programs has
continued to deteriorate. 8 Policies and programs appeal to the cultural
construction of teen pregnancy as burdens and risks."8 ' However, educa-
tion for these students, like all, has not only an aim of qualifying them
for positions but also the core aim of educating for education's sake.
Consider this quote from Superintendent Cami Anderson, whose New
York school district included the controversial "P" Schools: "The most
powerful thing we can do for parenting teens is help them get their di-
plomas .... Your brain does not die when you become pregnant. ,9
Notice how Anderson says nothing about educating these girls to im-
prove their ability to get good jobs so that they can take care of their
families without any government assistance. Rather, her comment is
about the intrinsic value of education for these young mothers-
something that far too often is left out of the discussion surrounding
teen pregnancy, an illustration of how society talks about educating the-
se mothering students . 29 ' Failing to view education in this more holistic
manner for this group of students, while recognizing it for others,
287. Kelly, supra note 283, at 445-46.
288. Pillow, supra note 10, at 86 ("A lack of federal funding initiatives to implement Title
IX particularly explains the lack of program development. Without authorization
funds to support the development of school-based teen pregnancy programs for preg-
nant/mothering students, school district had little incentive to proactively develop
programs for such students."); Hanson et al., supra, note 2, at 43 (descrihing that
funding used to exist but has deteriorated); but see Luttrell, supra note 14, at 15-16
(describing that funding used to exist but has deteriorated).
289. See Kelly, supra note 283, at 445 ("Negative stereotypes, so often publicly voiced,
have permeated the institutions that control teen mothers' fates. For example, in
many districts of British Columbia, the Ministry of Social Services now subsidizes
day care for young mothers, regardless of whether they are on welfare. Although this
is a valuable service for the mothers, the Ministry justifies this policy based on the as-
sumption that any child of a young mother is 'at risk of neglect or abuse.' Many teen
mothers are poor and in need of material support, yet to receive it they get construct-
ed as inadequate mothers. This occurs despite research that a mother's age is far less
important than other factors in determining her parenting behavior .
290. Bosman, supra note 252, at 2.
291. See Pillow, supra note 10, at 46 ("Clinton clearly linked 'illegitimate births' with
poverty, and situated the problem of teen pregnancy with welfare reform and the
economic stability of the United States."); id. ("[Elven a-midst this heightened discus-
sion of education for all, school-age mothers did not become education subjects.").
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illustrates the discrimination and discursive structures to which they
292
have become subjected .
C. Impact of the Perception of Weak Case Law,
Lack of Knowledge, and Marginalization
Research by Professors Pillow and Kelly supports that the teens
most likely to carry their child to term are those who are poorer .29 ' Lut-
trell reinforces this by describing the mothers that participated in the
program that she studied in contrast with those who were able to "opt
,,t294 and how Title IX seemed to mark the end of "de jure but not de
facto discrimination against pregnant students-discrimination by way
of subtle forms of discipline, punishment, and racial segregation!"
The literature addressing school-aged current and expectant moth-
ers supports that more affluent teen mothers are more likely to have
abortions, give up the baby for adoption, or use family resources to help
tackle the obstacles brought by pregnancy and motherhood so that they
are able to keep it private and "out of school." Pillow describes the dif-
ferent perceptions and experiences of the quiet teens as compared to
those unquiet mothers: "IIO1ne pregnant girl said to me 'they just handle
it better ... like they were never pregnant and teachers and other kids
just forget they ever were pregnant or had a baby.' Handling 'it better' in
292. An example of viewing women's education for education's sake is discussed in
"Knowledge as the Necessary Food of the Mind": Charlotte Mason's Philosophy of
Education. Stephanie Spencer, "Knowledge as the Necessary Food of the Mind":
Charlotte Mason's Philosophy of Education, in WOMEN, EDUCATION, AND AGENCY
1600-2000 105, 109 UJ. Spence, S.J. Aiston & M. Meikle eds., 2009) ("We say 'what
is the good of knowledge?' Give a boy professional instruction, whether he is to be a
barrister or a bricklayer, and strike out from his curriculum Greek or geography or
whatever is not of utilitarian valu.... .Now here, is a most mischievous fallacy, an as-
sertion that a child is to he brought up for the uses of society only and not for his own
uses.") (emphasis added).
293. Pillow, supra note 10, at 117 ("Teens most impacted by teen pregnancy are young
women who are already living in impoverished conditions prior to becoming preg-
nant."'); see also Kelly, supra note 283, at 442 (" [P]oorer teenagers are more likely to
carry their pregnancies to term. Also, fertility rates are higher within certain ethnic
and racial groups. Therefore, as Luker . .. has observed, the risk of teen pregnancy
does not occur with 'equal frequency,' and when people falsely universalize the issue,
they mask and confuse disadvantages by class, race, and gender.").
294. LUTTRELL, supra note 14, at 20 (". .. [F]amilies with resources are likely to seek (and
are often encouraged to do so) less stigmatized educational options for their daugh-
ters."); see also McNeeley, supra note 37, at 268 (". .. [T]eens from low-income
families are also significantly more likely to drop out of school.").
295. LUTTRELL, supra note 14, at 20.
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this case refers to keeping the pregnancy invisible-keeping your preg-
nant-self and/or mothering-self separate from school.,116 For example,
during her research, Pillow
* [ o]bserved or heard stories about the pregnant/mothering
teen who stayed in school until her last trimester at which
point she stayed at home and received home tutoring. After
the birth . .. she returned to school, stepping back into her
original classes-she remained invisible to her school during
the height of her pregnancy and returned to school without
any need of special support, thus minimizing her new role as
Mother. Most girls who ... followed this pattern ... were col-
lege-track Caucasian srtudens-some who decided to give
their child up for adoption or had a mother at home to take
on primary caretaking of the child."9 '
That keeping the pregnancy "quiet" is the "right" way of handling a
pregnancy is a product of discourse. Further, that the "right" way is una-
vailable to students from low SES backgrounds feeds the discursive
mechanisms and furthers the marginalization of the students affected.
The discourse affects teachers' and administrators' perceptions and
treatment of pregnant and parenting students. Research by Nash and
Dunkle showed, among other things, that of twelve surveyed schools:
42% did not always excuse absences due to pregnancy related
problems such as nausea, morning sickness, and fatigue..
42% reported that teachers did not always allow pregnant
teens flexibility to leave the classroom to go to the bathroom
or to the health room for pregnancy related problems ..
67% do not always make arrangements for pregnant students
who need to urinate frequently to leave the classroom quickly
and with minimal disruptions, such as providing a reusable
hall pass ...
25% usually or sometimes tracked pregnant and parenting
students into a specific area, such as home economics and 8%
required the students to go into such specific areas ..
296. Pillow, supra note 10, at 115.
297. Id. at 131.
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25% did grant sufficient medical leave for childbirth, and only
half of schools reinstated students to their previous status after
pregnancy leave ...
25% of schools do not allow caring for a sick child as an ex-
cused absence ... 29
And, as described, more recent research indicates that such viola-
tions continue. Brake found,
For the most part, the outright exclusion of pregnant students
from regular classrooms no longer occurs. Instead however,
pregnant students are likely to face more subtle forms of dis-
crimination, such as coercive counseling . . .. Teachers may
also consider pregnant students to be hopeless and nor worth
the additional effort it would take to enable them to continue
in school .
For example, research by McLaughlin describes how teachers' atti-
tudes are shaped by the context of their students and how teachers
specified pregnancy as one of the reasons "students [are] burdened and
distracted," which impacted teachers' attitudes."~
Additionally, research by Richard Arum and Doreet Preiss indicates
that students from low socioeconomic backgrounds are unlikely to en-
force their legal righ ts. 0 ' Thus, those who are likely to experience the
most harm from Title IX violations are the least likely to seek legal re-
dress. The result of these practices is a continued marginalizarion that
affects not only the mothering student but also her child. Hence,
[t]he reader will find that the pregnant/mothering teen most
likely to stay in school or to utilize school-based teen parent
programs contrasts with the teen for whom Title IX was
298. NASH & DUNKLE, supra note 261, at 7-8.
299. Brake, supra note 14, at 142; see also note 214 and accompanying text.
300. Milbrey Wallin McLaughlin, What Matters Most in Teachers' Workplace Context?, in
IN TEACHERS' WORK: INDIVIDUALS, COLLEAGUES, AND CONTExTS 79, 82 (Judith
Warren Little & Milbrey Wallin McLaughlin eds., 1993) ("Teachers' comments
about the aspects of their students that had the greatest impact on their classroom
practices focused on the cultural diversity of students in their classes and on the de-
mands, difficulties, and pressures associated with today's students. . .. Teachers see
today's students burdened and disttacted as never before by . .. pregnancies.").
30 1. Richard Arum & Doreet Preiss, Still Judging School Discipline, in FROM SCHOOL-
HOUSE TO COURTHOUSE: THE JUDICIARY'S ROLE IN AMERICAN EDUCATION 238
(Joshua M. Dunn & Martin R. West eds., 2009).
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developed. ... shed [ding] further light on why there has been no
case law under Title IX to determine what educational opportuni-
ties for school-age mothers looks like and why schools continue
to be ambivalent. 0
111. RESOLUTION: INCREASED KNOWLEDGE BUILDING
ALONGSIDE INCREASED REGULATION
Fershee argues for increased regulation to improve the deficiencies
in the implementation of Title IX for pregnant and parenting stu-
dents. 0 3 This Article agrees that increased regulation by the Office for
Civil Rights will improve implementation, but proposes that increased
regulation alone, without increased awareness and knowledge building
of relevant actors, is insufficient. 0 4 Scholars in the field agree that
knowledge building will improve implementation of Title IX, as well as
of other laws. 0 ' Accordingly, this Article now shifts focus to discuss
knowledge building for the students and those who influence them.
A. Students and Pa rents
The lack of knowledge leads professors Nancy Lesko and Wendy
Luttrell to call for an increase in student knowledge of their reproductive
rights. 0 Kelly reiterates the importance of the reproductive rights, em-
phasizing that such rights extend beyond "choice" and describes that
11young women 'need solid information and safe contraception that
serves their needs.' . .. Feminists argue that young people need access to
' sexuality education."' To these calls more for more rights education,
this Article seeks to emphasize the importance the role of education of
such reproductive rights, including the Title IX rights. However, given
the discursive powers already discussed, student and/or parent awareness
will not ensure the assertion of these rights, and those who do assert
such rights may encounter school personnel reacting with disbelief or
302. Pillow, supra note 10, at 13.
303. See Fershee, supra note 14.
304. For discussion of how neither top-down nor bottom-up change works alone, see
FULLAN, THE NEW MEANING OF EDUCATIONAL CHANGE (4th ed. 2007).
305. See infra notes 307, 309-3 10 and accompanying rext.
306. LESKO, supra note 33, at 145; LUTTRELL, supra note 14.
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disapproval . Thus, as taken up in the next paragraphs, awareness and
knowledge by school faculty are the most likely means of improving the
observation of Title IX for pregnant and parenting students. At the same
time, student and parent awareness will increase educators' awareness, as
each time such rights are asserted, school personnel will be confronted
with realities and enforceability of the legal requirements.
B. Teachers and Administrators
Ducker specifically calls for increased knowledge on the part of
school district officials about Title IX requirements for pregnant and
parenting teens,'O and scollaw scholars continue to call for more
general knowledge building in the area of law and education for educa-
tors and lawyers. 09 This chorus emphasizes that understanding simple
legal principles and knowing when to seek additional advice can save
schools money, time, energy, as well as provide peace of mind. 10 These
saved resources "can be better devoted to education."3"' School law
scholars agree that knowledge of education law enables the development
of policies and practices that provide equal educational opportunities to
all and respect core constitutional rights, and such scholars question
whether equity in education will be achieved without the development
of knowledge of relevant law.3"' Indeed, a 2009 study indicated that
while a majority of principals were uninformed or misinformed about
school law issues, 85% indicated that they would change their behavior
if they were better informed."' 3 Thus, legal education would counteract
perceptions like that of one principal who stated, "We don't want to
307. See LUTTRELL, supra note 14. at 18 (describing teachers' reaction to "showing" and
students' refusal to seem apologetic).
308. Ducker, supra note 6.
309. Suzanne E. Eckes. Significant Legal Issues for Inclusion in Preservice Teacher Prepara-
tion Programs, 30 ACTION IN TCHR. EDuc. 25 (2008) [hereinafter Legal Issues];
Suzanne Eckes, Tort Law and Public Schools, in THE YEARBOOK OF EDUCATION LAw
140 (Charles J. Russo ed., 2007); Zirkel, supra note 267; Sarah E. Redfield, The Con-
vergence of Education and the Law: A New Class of Educators and Lawyers, 36 IND. L.
Ray. 609 (2003); Barry L. Bull & Martha M. McCarthy, Reflections on the Knowledge
Base in Law and Ethic for Educational Leaders, 31 EDuc. ADMIN. Q. 613 (1995).
310. Redfield, supra note 309.
311. Idat 639.
312. Legal Issues, supra note 309; Redfield, supra note 309; Elizabeth R. Parker & Sarah E.
Redfield, Law Schools Cannot Be Effective in Isolation, 2005 BYU EDUC. & L.J. 1, 5
(2005).
313. Matthew Militello, David Schimmel & Jake H. Eberwein, If They Knew, They Would
Change: How Legal Knowledge Impacts Principals' Practice, 93 NASSP BULLETIN 27
(2009).
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make it too easy for teen mothers; otherwise we'll reinforce the problems
of teen pregnancy.""
In addition to the money and time saved by avoiding or enabling
quick resolution of court proceedings, limiting litigation will also reme-
dy the positioning of schools and parents as adversaries and enable
collaboration between schools, parents, and lawyers."' 5 Such collabora-
tion, in the place of litigation, promises overall improvements to the
development of education policy and educational attainment of minori-
ty groups. "[Tihe best intended and conceived litigation strategies have
yet to produce equity and diversity along with the educational pipe-
line. . .. We have . .. not worked consistently or collaboratively with
other educators along the continuum to understand and address the real
problems or to improve student achievement along the pipeline.,
1 6
Ultimately, legal education holds promise for challenging teachers'
perceptions of pregnant students as well as teachers' practices of clinging
to traditional approaches despite students' new and/or unique needs.' 
17
The resulting perception has the potential to reverse the belief that
pregnant students are social burdens and lead teachers to recognize
pregnant and parenting students as rights-bearing individuals. This po-
tential refers back to the earlier claim that legal education for teachers
and administrators has promise to improve equity in schools."' 8
An approach of knowledge building alongside regulation respects
the professionalism of teachers and utilizes their context-specific
knowledge, rather than undermining it through an approach of in-
creased top-down regulation alone."1 ' Further, institutionalizing the legal
education requirements for school personnel would result in more col-
leges, universities, and continuing education service providers increasing
the offerings of legal education courses and programs. Formal education
through such courses as a means of developing knowledge will be more
314. Pillow, supra note 10, at 79.
315. Redfield, supra note 309.
316. Parker & Redfield, supra note 312, at 16-17.
317. McLaughlin, supra note 300, at 85 (describing finding that nontraditional students
often failed when teachers maintained traditional approaches and standards, as well as
trend by some teachers to continue such traditional approaches).
318. See supra note 309 and accompanying text.
3 19. Fershee proposes increased oversight by the federal government, including increased
reporting requirements. For discussion of weaknesses in top-down implementation
and regulation and the case for backwards mapping, see Richard Elmore, Backwards
Mapping: Implementation Research and Policy Decisions, 94 POL. Sci. Q 601 (1979);
Levinson et al., supra note 273; Malen, supra note 273.
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feasible than expecting such individuals to teach themselves 2 or seek
out courses that may or may not be offered at a university.32
CONCLUSION
This Article analyzed the multifaceted situation surrounding preg-
nant and parenting school-aged parents and Title IX. The Article
compared research indicating ongoing widespread Title IX violations in
this context to the relatively meager litigation landscape and concluded
that the number of cases and judicial opinions directed to this issue is
disproportionately low. Finally, this Article proposed a means of directly
addressing the first two of the three reasons proposed for the weakly de-
veloped case law: a) the widely shared view that there is no or very little
helpful case law; b) lack of knowledge; and c) marginalization. Finally,
this Article argues that while Title IX is a centerpiece for providing legal
protections of these students, Title IX does not and cannot by itself pro-
vide a means of addressing all rights violations. Other areas of law,
including privacy, the First Amendment, the Fourth Amendment, and
the Fourteenth Amendment may be utilized in protecting the rights of
these students.
This last point highlights one of several areas for future research.
Legal and/or social science research focused on how various educational
policies implicate privacy, First Amendment, and Fourth Amendment
rights of these pregnant and parenting students would provide new ar-
chitecture to the implications of weak implementation of this aspect of
Title IX and offer useful information for addressing inequitable treat-
ment. Further, research about knowledge and awareness of these
students' legal rights by both educational and legal professionals would
be a useful next step for determining where to focus knowledge building
programs. In connection to the research about awareness, research re-
garding the effectiveness of coursework. and continuing professional
education programs would provide information necessary to under-
standing where and why knowledge gaps exist. Similarly, additional
research about what it means to fulfill the Title IX Regulations' re-
quirements that separate programs be completely voluntarily chosen by
affected students and what it means for separate programs to be compa-
rable to those offered to non-pregnant students would provide
320. Ducker, supra note 6, at 450 (proposing that district personnel become aware of Title
IX requirements but providing no proposed method for ascertaining education law
knowledge).
321. See supra notes 267-268 and accompanying text.
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pragmatic guidance for these areas that remain unaddressed by case law.
Finally, applying the lenses offered by feminist legal theory, specifically
Martha Albertson FinemanS32  vulnerability approach and Nancy
Dowd's 2 1 approach to asking "the man question," would provide ex-
planatory power for the situation of pregnant and parenting students. t
322. Martha Albertson Fineman, Grappling with Equality: One Feminist Journey, in
TRANSCENDING THE BOUNDARIES OF LAw: GENERATIONS OF FEMINISM AND LEGAL
THEORY (Martha Albertson Fineman, ed. 2011); Martha Albertson Fineman, The
Vulnerable Subject: Anchoring Equality in the Human Condition, in TRANSCENDING
THE BOUNDARIES OF LAW: GENERATIONS OF FEMINISM AND LEGAL THEORY, at 162.
323. NANCY E. DOWD, THE MAN QUESTION: MALE SUBORDINATION AND PRIVILEGE 14
(New York, N.Y.U. Press. 2010) ("The potential that 'asking the man question' in
feminist theory suggests, particularly by exploring masculinities scholarship, is to en-
rich feminist theory by clarifying, reorienting, and further contextualizing how and
why inequalities exist. ... it would include those places where men are disadvantaged,
where women may have privilege as part of their subordinated status, and it would
connect the interactions of men and women in the gender system rather than pre-
suming that their interests are oppositional in all situations").
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